Assisted reproduction: Deciding what\u27s best for the child, the family, and our society by Fisher, Gayle R
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations 
1-1-1999 
Assisted reproduction: Deciding what's best for the child, the 
family, and our society 
Gayle R Fisher 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds 
Repository Citation 
Fisher, Gayle R, "Assisted reproduction: Deciding what's best for the child, the family, and our society" 
(1999). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 969. 
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds/969 
This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be 
from any type o f  computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these wül be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to 
order.
UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: DECIDING WHAT’S BEST 
FOR THE CHILD, THE FAMILY, AND OUR SOCIETY
by
Gayle R. Fisher
Bachelor o f Arts 
University o f Nevada, Reno 
1978
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the
Master of Arts Degree 
Department o f Ethics and Policy Studies 
College of Liberal Arts
Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
May 1999
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
UMI Number: 13 94800
UMI Microform 1394800 
Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
U N iy
U N iy Thesis ApprovalThe Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
April 12 ■ 19 99
The Thesis prepared by
Gayle R. Fisher
Entitled
Assisted Reproduction: Deciding What’s Best
for the Child, the Family» and Our Society
Master of Arts in Ethics and Policy Studies
is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
_______ M aster o f  A rts  in  E th ic s  and P o lic y  S tu d ie s
Examination Committee Member
Exanyndtion Committee/Membei'
raduat/ Gollege Faculty Representative
L
animation Committee Chair
Dean of the Gracmate College
11
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
ABSTRACT
Assisted Reproduction: Deciding Together What’s Best for 
the Child, the Family, and our Society
by
Gayle R. Fisher
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f  Political Science 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
The use of high-tech reproductive technologies to have children is widely 
practiced today in the United States. While state statutes regulate this industry to some 
extent, this field is largely self-governed, and disputes between individuals are usually 
resolved through the courts.
In my thesis, 1 examine the inadequacy of public policy formation in the three 
more controversial areas o f  assisted reproduction: artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, and surrogate motherhood. Policy-making is mostly done indirectly and 
haphazardly through the courts and some state and federal legislation. There has been no 
organized national dialogue.
I recommend that moral consensus be sought on this issue through the formation 
of a national commission to study the current practice of assisted reproduction and to 
make recommendations for regulation, legislation, or further studies. The goal is to help 
build consensus on this important issue.
Ill
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Will the real mother please stand up? Is she mother number one, the genetic 
mom; mother number two, the gestational mom; or mother number three, the adoptive 
mom? In today’s world, it is possible to have all three kinds o f mothers. As for the 
fathers, there is the biological dad and the adoptive dad. However, the biological dad 
could also be a sperm donor without any intention o f playing a role in a child’s life. He 
could be known or anonymous to the mother.
The technological possibilities are numerous, amazing and frightening at the same 
time. My thesis looks at three of the more controversial areas o f assisted reproduction in 
terms of their potential effect on the changing role o f the family. They include artificial 
insemination, in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood. All three areas, depending 
on the particular decision made, may involve the donation of gametes or the use of 
another woman’s uterus, which sets into motion a whole new potential for dispute and 
controversy. A general discussion of these three areas is made before launching into a 
closer look at the ethical issues that concern many people. Many o f these assisted 
reproduction issues revolve around a person’s view o f the family, which is part of a larger 
cultural debate taking place in America today.
In trying to decide what is the best approach for dealing with reproductive
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technologies, one needs to look at several factors. First, who are making the decisions 
about these technologies today, and is that ethically acceptable to most people? Second, 
if  most policy decisions are being made by judges, and to a lesser extent legislators and 
administrators, are they good decisions that take into account ethical dilemmas? Third, if  
laws are not the answer, or only part of the answer, what examples are available to use as 
a guide, and what works and doesn’t work about them? Fourth, is moral consensus the 
right thing to strive for, keeping in mind our need for personal autonomy? Fifth, would 
the establishment of a national commission fit in with this country’s style and tradition o f 
decision making, and do precedents serve as good indications for the success of an ethical 
commission in this area? Sixth, does the establishment o f a national commission on 
reproductive technologies fill a real need in this country? Finally, what would an ethics 
commission look like in terms of authority, scope, membership, and function? Answering 
these questions gives us guidance on what to do to fill this important need in this country.
Decisions about reproductive technologies, made every day by thousands of 
Americans and others around the world, usually remain private until there is a problem. 
Then it becomes a legal battle that is usually resolved in the courtroom and sometimes by 
state or federal legislation.
A study o f common law cases involving reproductive technologies sheds only a 
dim light on the judicial and, to a lesser extent, societal response to assisted reproduction. 
At the present moment, however, for better or usually for worse, it seems to be the best 
indicator available of society’s response to these technologies.
This is due to an unwilling legislative and regulatory response to these 
technologies. This can be partly attributed to the U.S. Constitution, which protects a
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person’s right to privacy and a person’s right to procreate and to have a family.
Many critics argue that resolving these complex, changing technological issues 
through the courts is the wrong approach. First, using common law cases in general to 
resolve broader societal issues is inadequate because o f the attention paid solely to the 
parties involved. Second, using common law cases in technological and scientific areas 
invites criticism because judges and lawyers usually have a limited knowledge in these 
areas. Third, using common law cases in the area o f assisted reproduction usually does 
not address the ethical issues underlying the disputes. Common law is not, by its nature, 
set up to be forward looking or far-reaching in its decision making.
While many people have written books and articles stressing the importance of 
our society grappling with the controversial issues involving reproductive technologies, 
state and local governments have remained uncommitted to resolving the complex issues 
raised by technological advances in the area of reproduction. A look at state and federal 
legislation shows wide disparity in the decisions that are being made about these 
technologies. Policy makers lack the time, the knowledge, the expertise and, some would 
say, the courage to enact thoughtful legislation. Still others say legislation is not needed.
Many experts have called for some kind of moral consensus on this issue in 
advance of legislation. The field o f bioethics has looked at the issue o f consensus for 
many years, and there is much disagreement about what kind o f consensus is good, and 
whether it is achievable. A review of those findings reveals what has been done in this 
field, and what the experts say about moral consensus and how this might be undertaken 
on such complex topics as egg donors, donor insemination and surrogate motherhood.
One popular discussion in bioethics is the formation of ethics commissions to help
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achieve consensus, not only in reproductive technologies but other topics as well. Other 
countries have moved much farther ahead in this area, choosing to delve into this arena 
through the formation o f national boards or commissions, whose members study the issue 
and eventually make recommendations which have in some cases turned into national 
legislation. The formation o f national commissions to study important technological and 
social issues is not new to the United States. These commissions have had mixed 
successes and an analysis of their work is shown in an effort to find how they have or 
have not achieved consensus, and how they have resolved controversial issues. A look is 
also taken at what has been done in the area of reproductive technologies in particular in 
terms of trying to achieve any degree o f moral consensus. For such a consensus, the 
framework, scope, membership, authority, and deliberation process are important aspects. 
A number of authors have examined this and similar issues, and have as many opinions 
about the outcome of such a commission.
My thesis critiques the reproductive choices that are being made today and by 
whom, and what issues are being confronted and how. Decision making by judges, 
legislators and experts are examined with an eye toward how all this fits in with society’s 
changing role of the family. The paper then looks at how other countries are dealing with 
reproductive technologies and how those models may be applied to the United States. A 
background look at national commissions and the concept o f consensus is examined 
before recommending the framework, scope, and authority o f such a commission and how 
it could be used to help all stakeholders for assisted reproduction.
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CHAPTER II
INFERTILITY, CHOICE, AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
Infertility affects some 10 to 15 percent o f all married couples in the United 
States. Infertility is defined as a  failure to conceive after one year of regular coitus 
without contraception. A 1988 report o f  the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment said that Americans spent $1 billion in 1987 to combat infertility. More than 
10 million Americans are struggling to have children; more and more women are waiting 
until the age o f  35 or later to try to become pregnant, and more than 25 percent o f those 
women are failing in that effort.'
In 1991, at least five states required insurance carriers to cover infertility 
treatments, including in vitro fertilization. Insurance coverage is a continuing debate. Tlie 
average cost o f diagnostic and medical treatments for infertility in 1988 was more than 
$2,500 per couple. About 18 percent o f the babies bom in the United States in 1990 were 
expected to result from the benefit o f  infertility treatments, or about 200,000 babies. Less 
than half o f the couples seeking treatment end up with babies.'
Reproductive technologies also benefit those who are not infertile. Single 
women, couples with inheritable genetic disorders, gay couples, and older women are 
undergoing some of these procedures in order to have children. They choose to use these 
procedures, although some clinics have policies that discourage the use of reproductive
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technologies except in cases o f  infertility. Others have guidelines restricting assisted 
reproduction to ineligible patients due to age, health, and other factors.
Artificial Insemination
In today’s technologically advanced world, it is not only possible to have sex 
without reproduction concerns, it is also possible to have reproduction without sex 
concerns. The first recorded occurrence of this happened in 1984 in Philadelphia to a 
woman who never knew what happened to her. Her doctor decided to perform the 
procedure after discovering the husband was infertile. He used a medical student’s sperm 
to perform the procedure, and nine months later she had a son. Since then, artificial 
insemination has evolved to the point where women can go to sperm banks, choose 
desired characteristics from a selection o f potential donors, and then inseminate 
themselves, if  they choose, with the donor semen. It is estimated that 400 commercial 
sperm banks operate in the United States today, some 11,000 private physicians perform 
the procedure, and about 80,000 women undergo artificial insemination by donor, called 
AID, each year.^ Other estimates show 250,000 children being conceived by donor 
insemination each year and about 30 sperm banks operating in the United States."* This 
discrepancy seems to indicate the low level of record-keeping practiced for these 
procedures, particularly by doctors.
The world’s largest sperm bank, in New York, holds more than 30,000 specimens 
and has generated more than 11,000 babies since 1971. It is estimated that artificial 
insemination by donor is a $164 million a year industry. It is also estimated there are 
about 1,000,000 children bom through donor conception in the United States.^
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Most sperm bank operators who work directly with women are not concerned 
whether or not the woman is married or heterosexual as is the case at some medical 
clinics. The donor, however, is screened for a history of family diseases, current 
hereditary or venereal diseases, and mental illness.®
Like other infertility procedures such as surrogate motherhood and embryo 
transfer, donor insemination is changing the traditional family structure. With donor 
insemination, the mother is the “real” parent but her husband, if  she has one, isn’t the 
“real” father. He could be the legal father, if  he has adopted the child, or if the birth 
certificate lists him as the father. Many parents keeps this information secret, perhaps 
even from the obstetrician.^
Donor insemination, called AID, raises several moral issues for many people. As 
a result, those persons analyzing this subject have made a variety of recommendations 
including: halting the procedure entirely; regulating who is allowed to undergo donor 
insemination; counseling prospective participants as to their motivations; and screening 
donors on a psychological as well as medical level.*
Historically, donor insemination has been done in secrecy in doctors’ offices. The 
secrecy occurred for several reasons. Mainly, many husbands did not want anyone to 
know they were infertile. Second, most donors did not want any legal responsibilities for 
children. Third, many doctors did not want any legal or other kind of complications 
resulting from the revelation of donor identities. Fourth, most women undergoing donor 
insemination wanted their own children, and many were often worried about the legalit}' 
o f the children.® Birth records often named the husband as the father, and the child was 
considered the husband’s own. The procedure was used almost entirely for married
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couples whose husbands were infertile. Almost all procedures were performed by 
doctors, who decided for medical and ethical reasons who should be inseminated. Many 
doctors turned away patients who were unmarried, non-heterosexual or too old.^
Record keeping was virtually nonexistent, and doctors still resist attempts to 
legislate mandated record keeping on donor-inseminated patients. A 1979 study showed 
that 36.9 percent o f surveyed doctors kept records of donor insemination, and only 30.4 
percent documented the procedure to protect the patient and guard against malpractice 
suits. In 1990, guidelines set by members of the American Fertility Society endorsed 
donor anonymity by stating that physician records must remain confidential and should 
become available to parents and children on an anonymous basis only.'®
Secrecy still is a major part of the donor insemination process, particularly in 
doctors’ offices. However, more options are available today to women, especially older, 
single and lesbian women. First, more doctors are opening their doors to a broader range 
o f women. Second, sperm banks deal directly with women. Tliese sperm banks often 
have more liberal policies. Because secrecy is still the preferred option, there aren’t many 
parental advocates speaking out on this issue. Nor are donors or doctors doing much 
public speaking on this subject."
In Vitro Fertilization 
From the time the first test tube baby was bom in England in 1978, more than 
35,000 test tube babies have been bom in the United States, and thousands more embryos 
have been frozen. Most o f  the babies were conceived by in vitro fertilization, a process in 
which the father’s sperm is mixed with the mother’s egg outside the body in a glass dish.
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9The resulting embryo is then intended to be transplanted into a uterus.'" It is estimated 
that more than 250 fertility clinics use in vitro fertilization and other techniques, with an 
estimated $2 billion a year spent to treat infertility. A single attempt can cost $6,000 to 
$12,000, with fertility drugs costing hundreds o f dollars per dose.'^
The first successful use o f in vitro fertilization resulted in the birth o f Louise 
Brown, the world’s first test tube baby. Initially, I VF was used for a woman’s blocked 
fallopian tubes, but now is used for other reasons. For a few years after this birth, IVF 
was considered a magical, mysterious procedure largely because the scientists involved 
did not provide a lot o f information due to competition among th e m se lv e s .A t this time, 
60 percent o f  the general public polled approved o f IVF for infertile married couples, and 
53 percent said they would try IVF themselves if  they were married and unable to have a 
child by any other means.'®
By 1981, only three more IVF births were reported around the world. Research 
continued, and scientists began reporting on expanded uses for IVF. While it was 
initially used for blocked fallopian tubes, the use evolved to abnormal semen, sperm 
antibodies, endometriosis, and so-called unexplained infertility.'®
Between 1978 and 1984, ethical and religious objections to reproductive 
technologies were discussed in virtually every journal article. During this same period, 
the need for IVF as a cure for the infertility problem reached “plague” proportions, 
particularly for white, affluent women who wanted to have it all.'’
Between 1984 and 1987, feminists started to vocally oppose new reproductive 
technologies. Many felt the new reproductive technologies were the ultimate control o f 
women by male-dominated sciences. Before, many feminists felt that the new
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reproductive technologies represented instruments o f freedom for women.*® From 1987 
to present, the public grew more and more accepting o f routinely used techniques. Now, 
IVF has become more o f an accepted product, the need o f which is seemingly beyond 
dispute. The shift focused from the “need for” to the “right to” infertility treatments. The 
New England Journal o f Medicine claims the “pool o f patients” exceeds one million. In 
addition. Time Magazine said there are millions more undiagnosed patients. Now the 
debate often concerns the need for regulations and consumer protection.*®
In addition, the development o f the technique o f freezing and preserving embryos 
has created new uses for the procedure. Now, younger women can donate eggs to be used 
by older women, for example. Or embryos may be frozen for future use.
Surrogacy
Surrogate motherhood is the controversial practice in which a woman agrees to 
bear a child conceived by artificial insemination and to relinquish it at birth to others for 
rearing. The woman may or may not be genetically related.’®
Infertile couples seeking surrogates often hire attorneys and sign contracts with 
women recruited through newspaper ads. Presently, several hundred people probably 
have undergone this practice. What began with a few lawyers and doctors in Michigan, 
Kentucky and California is now national in scope. Surrogate mother centers exist in 
Maryland, Arizona, and several other states.”
Phillip Parker, a Michigan psychiatrist who has interviewed more than 275 
surrogate applicants, finds that the decision to be a surrogate springs from several 
motives. Most women willing to be surrogates have already had children, and many are
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married. They choose the surrogate role primarily because the fee provides a better 
economic opportunity than alternative occupations, but also because they enjoy being 
pregnant and the respect and attention that it draws. Some surrogates may also feel 
pleased, as organ donors do, they have given the “gift of life” to another couple.”
The couple must be willing to spend $20,000 to $25,000, depending on lawyers’ 
fees and the supply o f and demand for surrogate mothers.”  Others estimate fees as high 
as $125,000.”  The contract both sides enter into must deal with all sorts o f contingencies 
such as the surrogate mother’s unwillingness to surrender the child after birth, the claims 
of the husband of the surrogate mother, the birth o f a malformed child, or even the death 
or divorce o f the infertile couple prior to birth o f the child. The contract may include 
provisions that the mother does not smoke, drink alcohol, take drugs, etc.
The surrogate motherhood issue came to light in the famed “Baby M” case in 
1987 in New Jersey. In that case, the contracting parents and the gestational mother 
fought bitterly over the custody o f the child.
The technique can also be used to provide single men or gay couples with babies 
or to allow women the opportunity to avoid the risk, discomfort and inconvenience o f 
pregnancy.”
Surrogate motherhood is not a new technique, although it is often considered so in 
discussions involving reproductive technologies. In biblical days, barren women were 
provided with sons by surrogate mothers. Sarah in the Old Testament said to Abraham: 
“Behold now, the Lord has restrained me from bearing; I pray thee, go into my maid; it 
may be that I may obtain children by her.”’®
Many people are opposed to surrogacy because the practice involves the exchange
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o f money for a child. Others believe the practice exploits poor women who will become 
a surrogate mother solely for the financial benefits. Infertile couples desperate for a child 
o f their own believe that it is better to have a  child that is genetically related to at least 
one parent than no parent at all.
Summary
While infertility is a  major reason to seek assisted reproduction, other reasons 
exist such as the lack o f a  male partner, the lack o f a female partner, and so on. All those 
persons seeking assisted reproduction share a  common goal: the desire to make a child 
part o f the family, whether the family is a single parent, a married or unmarried couple, or 
a gay couple. While most people applaud a desire for children and a family, the 
controversy begins over the differing concepts o f the family structure. The next chapter 
discusses some of the ethical issues surrounding the use o f reproductive technologies, 
beginning with a discussion o f the family in today’s society.
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CHAPTER III
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE FAMILY 
Ethical issues in reproductive technologies are being discussed today on many 
fronts. The stakeholders in these debates include the embryos, the children, the social 
parents, the siblings, the gamete donors, the surrogates, the surrogate’s family, the 
extended family, the friends, the co-workers, the doctors, hospital and clinic staff, 
researchers, judges, lawyers, legislators, congressmen, feminists, ethicists, theologians, 
journalists, students, and consumers. In short, millions o f people have some sort of stake 
in the outcome o f reproductive technologies, whether they are concerned for themselves, 
for others, or for future generations.
The discussions are both private and public, and range from how it should be done 
to if it should be done at all. Others prefer a guarded approach to these technologies 
while many exalt each new step along the researcher’s path. Some prospective parents 
approve of one method while disapproving of others, even though the result is a child for 
another infertile person or couple. While the private discussions continue, there is rarely 
any loud public outcry except on occasional instances when media attention is drawn to 
the postmenopausal grandmother giving birth, the surrogate mother demanding custody, 
divorced couples fighting over the disposition of frozen embryos, or a doctor at a fertility 
clinic using his own sperm without permission or disclosure.
15
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This chapter discusses some o f the major ethical issues that are of concern to 
various stakeholders. A discussion o f the family initiates this discussion because many 
objections to these technologies are based on differing concepts o f the family structure, 
concepts grounded in our society’s culture and religion.
The Family
Many o f the ethical issues regarding reproductive technologies, but not all, stem 
from a particular person’s view of the family and marriage. Today, there is an upheaval 
in the family structure. Traditional families are competing with modem families for 
moral authority.
Until the last few decades, society understood the family as separate from other 
areas o f life. By the 1970s, 50 percent o f American marriages ended in divorce. About 
25 percent of households consisted o f one individual, and only 33 percent o f families 
contained two parents and their minor children. Some 45 percent of mothers with pre­
school children worked in 1980 compared with 12 percent in 1950. By the late 1980s, 66 
percent of children aged three and four were in day care or nursery school. Between the 
early 1960s and the early 1990s, the percentage o f children bom to unmaixied parents 
increased 500 percent, from 5 percent of all births to 25 percent.'
Many observers see a change in the social order with the breakdown of the family 
at the center o f that change. Others see the change in the family as positive. In any case, 
an acute awareness about the family has grown throughout society.’
Author Janet Dolgin, in Defining the Family, states that the dilemmas posed by 
these reproductive technologies provide an opportunity to examine these social responses
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to the changing family. Assisted reproduction involves new choices for people both 
within and outside o f traditional family structures. These choices, she claims, question 
the biological imderpinnings of the traditional conception of family. They also encourage 
people to create families in contexts that depend upon the assistance of third parties and 
that usually involve money exchanges, areas traditionally outside the realm o f  family life. 
As a result, assisted reproduction is being acclaimed for “enabling the creation of 
enduring, affectionate families.” It is also being condemned for “manipulating the 
dimension o f human reproduction and thereby contributing to the breakdown o f 
traditional family life.”^
This breakdown in the family is also seen as a larger cultural struggle. In the 
book. Culture Wars, author James Davison Hunter describes this country’s cultural 
conflict shift from a divide among religions to a divide among orthodox and progressive 
alliances within religions. He defines cultural conflict as “political and social hostility 
rooted in different systems of moral understanding.”^
Hunter claims the cultural conflicts throughout most of American history have 
taken place within the boundaries o f a larger biblical culture over religious issues. 
Underlying those disagreements, though, were basic agreements about life in the 
community and our country. He shows that the divisions taking place today are based on 
differences in world views rather than theological in nature. He then states that the 
discussions taking place today on such issues as abortion, child care, and gay rights can 
be traced to the question of moral authority. He defines moral authority as how people 
determine whether something is good or bad, right or wrong. Cleavages in differing 
world views cut across old lines of conflicts such as Protestants, Catholics and Jews.^
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The truth for orthodox advocates is that everything was created by God, that 
human life begins at conception, and from that moment on, it is sacred. Another truth is 
that the human species is male and female according to body, role, psyche and spiritual 
calling. Homosexuality is a perversion o f the natural order. The nuclear family is the 
natural form o f social structure and should remain inviolable from outside interference.^ 
The progressive view holds that there is no objective and final revelation directly from 
God, and scripture is, at best, a witness to revelation. Moral and spiritual truth can only 
be conditional and relative. It can come either from self-grounded rational discourse or 
personal experience. It is “this-worldly.” Personhood begins at or close to the moment of 
birth, male and female are differentiated solely by biology, and human sexuality is based 
on biological needs/
The author of Culture Wars believes the struggle over the family is at the heart of 
the culture war. And many issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and day care are 
family issues. Using this definition, reproductive technologies is also considered a family 
issue. The real issue is not whether the family is good or bad, but what constitutes a 
family.®
The family as an issue of social concern began in the 1960s and continues today.
In 1977, the Carnegie Council on Children recommended a comprehensive national 
policy on the family. In the 1980's White House Conference on Families, the difficulty in 
defining the American family was elevated permanently as part o f a national policy 
debate. The conference only succeeded in polarizing the issue further.®
The orthodox view of the family, according to Hunter, is a male-dominated 
nuclear family that both sentimentalizes childhood and motherhood, and celebrates
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domestic life as a retreat from the harsh realities o f industrial society. The author states 
that conservative Catholics, Mormons and evangelical Protestants view the survival of 
this type o f family as essential because it was ordained by God, established by nature, and 
fosters social harmony.
For the progressives, the bourgeois family is the symbol and source of inequality 
and oppression for women in society. The demands o f progressives, according to the 
author, are not just for civil rights, reproductive rights and equal opportunities for women, 
but a whole new conception of the family. To that end, progressive voices call for a 
change in the nuclear family structure and in society as a whole. The moderate view calls 
for the equal division o f domestic and public labor. The more extreme view sees the 
oppression o f women as rooted in their biological role in reproduction and demand the 
total abolishment o f  all forms of traditional and patriarchal authority. This is the radical 
feminist viewpoint expressed in articles and books against assisted reproduction because 
it keeps women oppressed.
The family struggle is divided over authority, or who has the final decision­
making power. The orthodox view favors the husband, the male head o f the household. 
The progressive view favors equal authority among men and women. This latter group 
favors such issues as equal rights for women. ‘ ’
Those holding the orthodox view believe that family obligation extends not only 
to the bom and living but to the unborn as well. Progressives reject the idea that one can 
be obligated to potential persons.'^
Progressive activists have a difficult time shaking the image of being anti-family, 
but they insist their view is just more inclusive than traditional views. Progressives tend
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to favor economic assistance for families in need and a coherent public policy.'^
The culture war is not just a debate about current social issues. The source of the 
conflict, according to Hunter, is competing moral visions. It is a  struggle over the 
meaning of America - who we have been, who we are today, and who we will be in the 
future.
So where do the various stakeholders for assisted reproduction fit into this debate? 
Reproductive technologies change the entire baby-making process, involving individuals 
beyond the traditional mother and father (gamete donors, fertility specialists, lawyers, 
etc.). Assisted reproduction changes the very framework through which participants 
understand the family, their values, and themselves. Exactly what changes are made, and 
whether they are good or bad, is at the heart o f the ethical debate about reproductive 
technologies. It is not only whether they are good for tlie persons directly involved, but 
whether they are good for others as well.
According to Keimeth Alpem, editor o f The Ethics o f Reproductive Technology, 
three issues are essential when looking at assisted reproduction: prudence, morality, and 
policy. He states that prudence dictates what is good for a person directly involved in a 
particular action. Is it beneficial or harmful to a woman if  she chooses to bear a child 
through surrogate contract? That, of course, depends on the person’s values and beliefs. 
However, sometimes what a person believes is good for her is not really the case at all. 
Morality, he continues, dictates what is good for all parties affected by an action and 
includes any relevant rights, principles, or values. Moral values indicate something that 
should be given weight in moral deliberations and preserved in action. Appeals to moral 
rights, principles, and values are constantly being made in the debates over reproductive
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technologies. Finally, Alpem states that policy concerns the responsibility and policies of 
social institutions. Falling under this heading are questions about whether a certain 
practice should be made illegal and whether the government has the power to make it 
illegal.'^
When addressing these issues, a  person is asked to identify and decide among 
various interests, rights, principles and values. In the area o f reproductive technologies 
this is difficult because our concepts and frameworks of family, for example, were 
developed without a view to the many possibilities that now exist. For example, Alpem 
explains that we may believe parents have certain rights and responsibilities regarding 
their children. All that is thrown into doubt, though, when there are questions about who 
is the “real” parent, as is the case with many of the reproductive technologies.
Therefore, some of the more difficult problems raised by reproductive technologies are 
how to modify or replace our categories so that reproductive technologies may fit into our 
previous understanding of concepts such as family. This may call for the eventual 
abandonment of traditional ways of thinking in favor of a way that helps us to understand 
and accept these new technologies in the context of the family structure.*®
One challenge, he claims, is how to look at cases when traditional concepts are 
insufficient for our imderstanding o f them. In donor insemination, a married woman may 
have a  child by a man who is not her husband. By this criterion, who is the child’s 
father? In the law, a husband who consents to his wife’s use o f this procedure is deemed 
to be the legal father of any resulting children. Legally, artificial insemination by donor 
does not constitute adultery. However, decisions of this sort are more complex and 
difficult outside formal systems such as the law.'®
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He states reproductive technologies appear to split apart concepts that this society 
has traditionally treated as unified. The concept o f  motherhood is a good example. 
Traditionally, a  mother is a  woman who bears and raises a  child. These new technologies 
make it possible for three women to share that role. Now we have to decide how to 
regard the three now separate relations and how the interests, rights, and responsibilities 
should be reallocated among them.
In the first two examples, there is the possibility o f modifying traditional concepts 
to fit a new view of mother and father. At a certain point, however, applying a traditional 
concept to a new possibility may become too confusing or unilluminating. While some 
may try to apply traditional concepts to surrogate motherhood, others simply cannot do it 
and need to develop a new concept for understanding.'®
Conceptual problems may also arise when one sort of framework is extended into 
the domain o f  another, as when economic, technological, or legal frameworks encroach 
on personal relationships, Alpem claims. When contracts are involved in parenting, for 
example, babies and reproductive relations are bought and sold, bringing about charges 
by some that these practices degrade persons to commodities and relationships to 
economic exchanges. When reproduction is conceived in technological terms of design, 
power, and manufacture, the consequence is that embryos are reduced to materials, and 
private personal intimacies are transformed into rational public ventures.'®
Traditional thinking may not be adequate for the new possibilities. What may be 
needed, according to Alpem, is a paradigm shift in our world view. In such revolutions, 
basic categories, methods and modes of explanation are completely transformed or 
abandoned and replaced. Reproductive technologies may be creating a condition in
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which there is a  continuing failure to resolve problems through the basic categories/®
To help society’s understanding of reproductive technologies, ethicists have tried 
to identify issues that need resolution. There are many ethical issues in the area of 
reproductive technologies, and they are often divided differently. In this review, they are 
divided by stakeholders, and various kinds of ethical concerns are considered under each 
category. Some of the more important categories are discussed below.
The Embryo
One issue that concerns many people is what to do with embryos that are not 
implanted inside a woman’s uterus, either frozen or not. Some people believe that if an 
embryo is human and alive, it should not be deprived o f a chance for development, and 
therefore should not be used for research. However, they would give moral approval to in 
vitro fertilization if each embryo produced were to be transferred to a utems. Others 
believe that human embryos are not yet human persons and that if it could be decided 
when an embryo becomes a person, it could also be decided when it might, or might not, 
be permissible for research to be undertaken.
The central objection to the use of human embryos for research is that they are 
human. The human embryo is seen as having the same status as a child or an adult, by 
virtue of its potential for human life. The right to life is held to be the fundamental 
human right, and the taking o f human life on this view is always wrong.
Those who favor the use o f human embryos for research cover a wide range of 
views. At one end are those who believe that only human persons should be respected as 
persons, and that a human embryo is not a person. Others believe the embryo is entitled
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to some measure o f respect beyond that accorded to other animal subjects, that respect 
cannot be absolute, and may be weighed against the benefits arising from research.
The United Kingdom’s Wamock Committee report, for example, recommended 
that no live human embryo derived from in vitro fertilization, whether frozen or unfrozen, 
may be kept alive, if  not transferred to a woman, beyond 14 days after fertilization, nor 
may it be used as a research subject beyond 14 days.®'
Other questions arise over the disposition o f  frozen embryos, particularly when 
one or both parents no longer want them implanted for the later birth o f a child. Who 
should be given priority consideration in this regard: the embryo, or the unwilling parent? 
Also, is it morally responsible to create more embryos than are needed for the birth o f a 
child? This happens frequently during in vitro fertilization.
The Child
Some people think it is pointless to discuss whether it is fair to the child to be 
bom through assisted reproduction techniques such as donor insemination or surrogacy. 
After all, without those techniques the child wouldn’t exist, so why discuss it? This is a 
major distinction from adoption, where the child is in this world already. An assisted 
reproduction child is planned because an individual or a  couple want him to be a part o f 
their family, for better or worse. This could be a married couple, a gay couple, or a single 
woman using donor insemination. The fact that the child is wanted is a positive sign for 
the child’s well-being. But what if  something goes wrong with the plans? What if  the 
surrogate mother changes her mind and sues for custody? What if  something is wrong 
with the child and nobody wants to claim the child?
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While one might argue that similar types o f events happen to children who aren’t 
the result o f assisted reproduction, does this justify the bad result? Fathers often abandon 
their children; and every day, some children are given up for adoption. Sometimes birth 
parents change their minds later. Other than a legal remedy, which is often inadequate, 
how does this society help protect the child o f assisted reproduction? Even orthodox 
families approve o f assisted reproduction within the confines of a marriage.
Who decides what is best for the child before it is too late? Do we say that 90 out 
o f 100 successful outcomes is still a good percentage? What about that unsuccessful ten 
percent? Is that acceptable to this society? Almost all children bom through donor 
insemination do not know about their true paternity. Is that right? Is this better for the 
family, even though studies show that the “secret” is always there, weighing down the 
parents? If  it is more acceptable for a child to be adopted and to know about it than to be 
the child of donor insemination, isn’t that fact alone worth thinking about? If  life cannot 
be lived within a mantle of truth, isn’t that a problem?
The law has taken some stands, identifying the married husband as the legal father 
o f a child, thus protecting his legal rights and preserving his financial responsibility.
But what about the child’s emotional well-being? A man the child thought was his father 
gets divorced from his mother. Now he’s fighting in court so that he won’t have to pay 
child support because he’s not the father. These court cases do not talk about the effect 
this has on the child. The same law protects the donor’s privacy and discourages record­
keeping, a key mandatory element in adoption practice.
Embryo transfer is newer and records fewer, but the same goes for this child. Do 
the parents tell him his hue maternal identity? What about the child with a 60-year-old
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birth mother? Is it fair for a child to have an aging mother? It seems that reproductive 
rights for parents which are protected under the U.S. Constitution can inadvertently cause 
harm to the child of those parents. While legal protection may exist, the moral aspect 
must be taken into account.
On the positive side, a child that is bom through assisted reproduction is related 
genetically to one or both social parents, unlike adoption. Most of these children are 
brought up in a welcome, loving environment. While progressives may argue that 
everyone is entitled to a family, and orthodox conservatives may argue that there are right 
kinds o f families and wrong kinds o f families, everyone applauds the notion o f  children 
being loved and welcomed.
However, questions are now being raised about whether in vitro fertilization and 
other technologies are creating serious illness and defects in a small but significant 
proportion of children who are bom of them. While advocates of procreative liberty 
argue these children are better off being bom with birth defects tlian not being bom at all, 
others believe it is morally irresponsible to forge ahead with such possible risks to the 
child.®®
The Parents
Discussing parents as stakeholders in this issue can mean many things. The 
parents could be the social parents, the genetic parents, the gestational mother, and so on. 
This could mean a single mom or dad, a gay couple, a married couple, or an unmarried 
couple. A sister or grandmother could be the gestational mother for a child, and a brother 
could be a donor.
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It seems that a devoted couple seeking to have a child through in vitro fertilization 
would be applauded by just about anyone for their determination. But a gay couple using 
a surrogate mother to have a child is not entirely accepted by many parts o f society. Is  
that fair? Legally it’s acceptable, but socially it may not be considered the right thing to 
do. That is a conflict between our values and the law. Both couples would love and 
cherish a child.
The surrogate mother is also a parent. She may be the gestational as well as the 
genetic mother. Is it right to force her to give up her rights to the child prior to her really 
understanding how she may feel about the baby once it is bom? The law is divided on 
this issue. On the other hand, what about the father and his wife who have invested their 
emotional stock in this surrogate arrangement? Aren’t their needs and wants important? 
How does society resolve this issue for everyone concerned? An outright ban would 
protect all parties concerned from potential heartbreak, but it would also prevent the 
possibility of children for some families. Does the surrogate mother really know what is 
best for her? Is she vulnerable to exploitation? Is she selling her babies? What happens 
if her health is harmed as a result o f the surrogacy?
As for donors, is there ever the possibility they may have patemal rights? Don’t 
donors deserve the same legal protection as married couples? Who do we as a society 
want to protect, the family or the donor?
When it comes to IVF procedures for the determination of characteristics such as 
sex, is this right? What about the color o f  the hair or eyes, or the shape of the nose? Are 
children lovable just as they are? If a 60-year-old woman wants to have a child, or an 
interracial couple want to have a white baby, should they be allowed to do it?
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Siblings and Other Family Members
The use o f  reproductive technologies affects the rest o f the family, too. How does 
a surrogate mother explain to her existing children that she plans to give away the child 
growing inside o f  her? What about the man who sells his sperm and later has his own 
family. Does he let them know that they have half brothers or half sisters somewhere in 
the world? Does a woman who donated her eggs to another couple tell her children what 
she has done? While all this may be legally acceptable, what are the moral implications 
for these sisters and brothers? How does the husband of a surrogate mother feel about the 
fact she is carrying another man’s baby? How does he react to her and the pregnancy?
The Doctors
In many cases, fertility specialists decide who may undergo certain procedures. It 
is possible for them to exclude older women and single women, for example. They also 
decide what to tell couples about their chances for success. It may be easier to make 
decisions when a life is threatened, or good health is at stake. However, infertility is not 
considered an illness by many, so this may be considered an elective or experimental 
procedure. Is it ethical to try an unproven procedure on a patient desperate to become 
pregnant? Doctors are deciding issues every day, and the outcome is different for each.
Judges and Lawyers
These stakeholders operate in an entirely different arena. They must consider the 
legal ramifications o f an action, not the ethical ones. Lawyers work on behalf o f their
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clients, so they look at the law in terms o f how it will benefit their clients’ position. 
Judges, usually knowledgeable in this area, look at legal precedent and analogy in making 
their decisions. Their ethical views may differ substantially from their legal opinions.
Researchers
Extraordinary events are happening in assisted reproduction, and the role o f 
researcher is extremely important to its success. However, many researchers privately 
worry about creating children with defects, something they don’t openly talk about 
because it creates fear. While the federal government cannot, by law, fund this type of 
research, it is still carried out by private institutions. Some critics wonder how safe these 
procedures are when desperate patients encourage eager researchers to push the envelope 
o f what is biologically possible.
One researcher, for example, is now trying to improve the chromosomes of the 
eggs of older women so that they can have their own babies. However, this unproven 
procedure involving many risks should be tried first on embryo eggs, but this research is 
forbidden. So this researcher must receive permission from a patient who wants to have a 
child, but can’t do so through any other means. One researcher admitted that, upon 
reflection, that this was probably unethical, but would probably go ahead and do it 
anyway.®®
Others
Other stakeholders include theologians, ethicists, consumers, students, and so on. 
Each has a stake in the outcome of reproductive technologies, either directly or indirectly.
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The Catholic church, for example, believes assisted reproduction outside the confines o f a 
marital relationship is not acceptable. Some ethicists believe surrogate motherhood is 
unacceptable but have no problems with in vitro fertilization. Radical feminists believe 
reproductive technologies exploit women, and consumers want laws and regulations that 
protect people firom firaud and abuse.
Summary
While these brief descriptions do not give full justice to the various views, the 
point that is being made is that there are many different viewpoints about numerous 
aspects of assisted reproduction. Ethicists debate the issues among themselves while 
doctors and patients are doing whatever is necessary to safely bring another child into this 
world. What is right for one person is wrong for another. Is there any common ground 
for agreement? Should there be? Who should decide, and what should they decide upon 
in this burgeoning fertility arena? Is it better to let things go on the way they are now, 
with some legal intervention upon occasion, or should we as a society make some 
decisions about the future o f the family and the role of assisted reproduction in 
determining the shape o f  that family?
The use o f reproductive technologies challenge our society’s most established 
ideas about motherhood, paternity, biological inheritance, the integrity o f the family, and 
the “naturalness” o f birth itself According to author Cris Shore, these debates tend to fall 
into three categories: ethical and practical problems about experiments on human 
embryos; questions that emphasize the problems posed for the structure o f parenthood; 
and what effects these technologies will have on women’s health and lives.®'*
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Whatever category is being discussed, the possibilities of assisted reproduction are 
astonishing to a society that has long understood human reproduction as the inevitable 
consequence o f  a natural biological process. While reproductive technologies are 
changing our view o f the family, they are part o f  a change that already was taking place. 
These new technologies were not widely available until after society had accepted other 
changes in the family such as no-fault divorce, non-marital cohabitation, prenuptial 
agreements, and so on, according to Janet Dolgin, author of Defining the Familv.®® These 
technologies, rather, have intensified questions about the dimensions o f  family life that 
were already being actively debated within the society.
Assisted reproduction provides a new context within which to consider the moral 
and social parameters of family. All stakeholders must be given a certain weight in any 
deliberations discussing the future of these technologies. With the various competing 
interests, it will be difficult to determine how we as a society will come to agreement on a 
shared set o f values.
This confusion about society’s view o f  the family is clearly apparent in the courts. 
To date, most decisions about assisted reproduction have been made in common law 
cases. These decisions, in large part, have reflected the more conservative values of our 
society due to the nature of judicial decision making. An examination and review of 
those decisions is covered in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 
Much, debate in the area of reproductive technologies has centered around the 
effectiveness o f decision making by the courts, and the paucity of laws made at the state 
and federal level. Society, it seems, has reached almost no consistent, generally accepted 
decisions about how to understand or regulate assisted reproduction. Ethicists disagree 
among themselves, and state legislatures have not “responded uniformly or 
comprehensively to the complexities of reproductive technology and surrogacy.” ‘
This chapter takes a look at how artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and 
surrogacy are being seen through the eyes of the law, both through judicial decisions and 
legislative decisions. First, a look is taken at how society’s view of the family seems to 
be affecting judicial decisions. Then a closer look is taken at what actually has been 
occurring in the specific areas of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and 
surrogacy. Finally, there is a brief analysis of why these methods may not be sufficient 
for the kinds o f decisions that are being made today.
Most experts would agree that the right to have children and a family is protected 
under the U.S. Constitution. A number o f court cases reaching the Supreme Court have 
reaffirmed the view that the U.S. Constitution protects a person’s right to have children 
and a family. In Mever v. Nebraska (1923), the U.S. Supreme Court said constitutional 
liberty included the right o f  an individual to “marry, establish a home and bring up
34
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children.” In Skinner v. Oklahoma. (1942), the Supreme Court said marriage and 
procreation were among “the basic civil rights o f man.” In Stanlev v. Illinois . (1972), 
the Supreme Court observed that “the rights to conceive and raise one’s children have 
been deemed essential basic civil rights o f man...more precious than...property rights.” ® 
John Robertson, a Princeton University Professor, cites Skinner v. Oklahoma in 
concluding that almost every practice necessary to procreate should receive constitutional 
protection. He finds a constitutional right to reproduce technologically, to purchase 
sperm, eggs and gestational services, and even to enforce preconception agreements to 
rear offspring. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma 
statute authorizing forcible sterilization of thrice-convicted chicken thieves. Robertson 
argued that if  fertile persons possess a constitutional right to reproduce, then infertile 
persons must possess a right as well.® Critics argue that Robertson’s global constitutional 
principles are ill-suited to resolve the problems posed by the new reproductive 
technologies. Nevertheless, reproductive technologies are seldom challenged on a 
constitutional basis. ^
While the U.S. Constitution seems to protect a person’s right to have children, 
some unsettling questions remain about the use of reproductive technologies. For 
example, how are competing rights settled between two persons in a dispute over 
reproductive technologies? Are those consumers desperate to have children adequately 
protected firom profit-minded fertility clinics? Are we as a society really taking care of 
the best interests of the children, or are we making decisions based on what is good for 
one parent or another at the child’s expense?
Many experts seem to agree that most decision making in this area is being made
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by judges in common law cases that are often limited in scope and vision. Artificial 
insemination, surrogacy, and in vitro fertilization cover some of the more controversial 
aspects o f modem day baby making. The swirl o f controversy surrounding these 
technologies is also part o f a larger debate on the future o f the family.
In 1990, four women from Yale University and Kent State University published a 
report analyzing judicial opinion on reproductive technologies in the United States up to 
February 1990. After eliminating irrelevant cases, they examined 31 cases. These cases 
dealt mostly with child support in reproductive technologies, conflicts with existing 
statutes, paternity rights in artificial insemination and surrogacy, and adoption and 
custody in reproductive technologies. In their conclusion, they said their analysis 
confirms the social nature o f reproductive technologies. They also said that court 
decisions reflect an “unwavering commitment to the nuclear family structure.”®
As part o f my thesis, information was obtained using the same terms and the same 
source (Lexis-Nexis) for the period from 1990 until September 1998. This search reveals 
a slight shift in the types o f cases being brought before the state and federal courts. First, 
there were about 80 cases dealing with such issues as insurance coverage for in vitro 
fertilization, artificial insemination, surrogacy, and liability for in vitro fertilization 
procedures. About 20 cases involved surrogacy arrangements revolving around custody 
issues and contractual violations. Some 15 cases involved artificial insemination by 
donor. Some donors wanted paternity in cases dealing with unmarried women and/or 
lesbians, and others involved child support and paternity issues between formerly married 
couples. A couple of cases involved artificial insemination and procreation rights of 
prisoners. One case involved the disposition o f  the frozen sperm of a dead person. A
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couple of cases involved the disposition of frozen embryos. More than a dozen cases 
involved a dispute between an individual and an insurance company, or an individual’s 
company. A few cases involved liability issues between an IVF patient and a clinic or 
hospital. Mostly, the search reveals that issues revolving around surrogacy, IVF 
procedures, and artificial insemination are still around in the 1990s. In addition, there has 
been an increase in the number of consumer issues such as insurance coverage and 
liability of physicians and hospitals.®
Artificial insemination has been around for many decades, and many believe that 
some form of consensus has emerged on the use o f this procedure although some ethical 
issues remain, such as whether or not to protect the privacy o f semen donors and whether 
or not to require mandatory record keeping. Some donors are demanding paternity rights 
if the review o f recent court cases are any indication. In vitro fertilization and surrogacy 
emerged as society began to acknowledge and openly accept changes that departed from 
the traditional understandings of family. Options about how and when to create children, 
about which gamete should be used to create them, about which woman should be used to 
gestate them, etc, dramatically complicate society’s ongoing debate about the family.®
The Courts Dominate Family Debate 
The choices presented by assisted reproduction can be defined as conforming to 
traditional models of family, as when technology is used to create children for desperate, 
infertile couples. However, these choices can also be perceived as destroying traditional 
families and everything those families represent, as when the technology is viewed as 
turning women and children into commodities and parents into business partners. Society
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and the law must decide not only who is a mother, the father, or the baby, but what is a 
“mother,” a “father”, or a  “baby.” It becomes more difficult to argue that biology is fate. 
Hence, the fate of children and families becomes more variable and uncertain.*
Author Janet Dolgin states the law is being asked to respond to the disruptions 
presented by reproductive technology, just as traditional assumptions about the social 
dimensions of family and the character of kin relations are being questioned and eroded 
more generally. For the most part, the task has fallen to the judiciary. Courts are 
responding by settling particular disputes, but that is not all they are doing. They are 
beginning to erect a set o f frames within which to think about and to develop the family 
of the future. They are, in short, being asked to develop a new social and moral vision of 
families so that they can determine the appropriate response to the social and moral 
dilemmas created by the new reproductive technologies.®
Dolgin adds that courts may be seen as providing a potential laboratory that 
legislators may review if  and when states respond to the new reproductive technologies 
and surrogacy with comprehensive statutory rules. State legislatures have hesitated to 
respond to the complex, volatile questions raised by assisted reproduction, but courts do 
not have that option because judges deal with real people who demand resolution of their 
problems. As a result, courts have become the primary arena in which the society is 
constructing its response to assisted reproduction.'®
Courts, unlike legislatures, cannot delay or limit responses to reproductive 
technology and surrogacy until a social consensus emerges or until the absence of 
regulation becomes disastrous for the society. Parties to specific, unresolved disputes 
occasioned by assisted reproduction seek judicial resolution, and the judiciary must
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battles between a surrogate mother and the intending parents, or between a woman 
anxious to use her dead lover’s frozen sperm and his grown children, or disputes between 
gamete donors and fertility clinics.
Dolgin states court decisions, however, are characterized by bewilderment and 
inconsistency. In many cases, trial courts’ opinions are turned over on appeal or are 
affirmed but, as illustrated in Johnson v. Calvert (1993), McDonald v. McDonald (1994), 
and Davis v. Davis (1992), are made on the basis o f  an analysis entirely at odds with the 
first court. Judges have tended to preserve traditional conceptions of the family in cases 
occasioned by surrogacy and the new reproductive technologies, while at the same time 
rendering decisions that threaten traditional understandings of family."
Two court cases, Johnson v. Calvert, and McDonald v. McDonald, illustrate the 
complexities o f  dealing with reproductive technologies. The Johnson case involved a 
couple, each o f  whom provided a gamete to be joined and then gestated in another 
woman’s uterus. The McDonald case involved a wife who gestated an embryo formed 
from the fertilization of a donated ovum with her husband’s sperm."
In the Johnson case, the two lower courts and the California Supreme Court 
awarded the baby to Mark and Crispina Calvert, but on different grounds. The state 
supreme court relied on the notion o f parental intent rather than biology or the state 
statute’s definition of mother. However, the Calverts and Johnson both based their 
appeals to the court on alternative interpretations o f the reproductive process that led to 
the birth o f baby Christopher. Previously, gestation was long understood as the symbol 
and essential instance o f biological maternity.
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In her court case, Anna Johnson stressed that nature creates a bond between a 
woman and a baby that she gestates and bears, and that bond establishes the mother-child 
connection. The Calverts emphasized their biological link to the child as conclusive of 
their parentage.
In the McDonald case, the woman who intended from the start to be the social 
mother provided the gestational, but not the genetic component, o f biological maternity. 
The case was between a man and a woman rather than a couple and a woman. In this 
case, donor eggs were planted into the wife’s uterus, and twins were bom. The couple 
later divorced, and the father fought for sole custody because he was the biological father, 
and the woman wasn’t. In the McDonald case, the court determined Olga McDonald to 
be the natural mother because she was the intentional mother, just as the Johnson case."
In both cases, the judges decided on “intent” to establish the parentage of a baby 
with two biological mothers. As used by the court in the Johnson case, the concept of 
intent represents a contractual and a traditional view o f family. The egg donor became 
the legal mother because o f intent. In McDonald, the gestational mother was identified as 
the mother because she intended to be the social mother. The presumption in the Johnson 
case that an intending parent will be a good parent is arguably stronger than the 
comparable presumption about biological parents in other cases.
In Davis v. Davis, a Tennessee court bowed to traditional understandings of the 
family by demanding that special respect be paid to the embryos, defined as valuable 
because of their potential to become children. However, the court bypassed the interests 
of the embryos and focused on those o f the progenitors. The court explained that ideally 
such disputes should be resolved by effecting the preferences o f the progenitors.
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In this case, Mary Sue and Junior Lewis Davis fought over custody o f  seven 
frozen embryos following their divorce. The wife wanted to save them for future 
implantation, and the husband wanted them discarded because he did not want to become 
an unwilling father. Three Tennessee courts heard the case, each basing its opinion on a 
view of the embryos’ existential condition radically different from that of the other two 
courts. One judge said the embryos were children and awarded custody to Mary Sue 
Davis. The Court o f  Appeals o f  Tennessee reversed that decision, stating the decision 
rested solely on who is entitled to control the embryos. The court stated both parties 
shared an interest in the embryos and should jointly control them. The state supreme 
court upheld the appellate court’s decision about sharing an interest but on different 
grounds. The court weighed the “relative interests of the parties in using or not using the 
pre-embryos.” The court stated that because Mary Sue Davis no longer intended to use 
them to get herself pregnant, but planned to donate them to an infertile couple, that the 
person who wanted to avoid procreation should then prevail. In June 1993, Junior Davis 
announced he had the embryos destroyed.'®
The varied response o f the courts to these two cases illustrates the depth and 
significance of the social and legal transformation of the family now occurring. The legal 
system is reacting with uncertainty and confusion, concludes Dolgin. The essential task 
of the courts, she adds, has become that o f mediating between the modem views of family 
characterized by choice, individuality and autonomy versus the traditional family 
characterized by “inexorable truth, holism and hierarchy.” Courts have employed a 
variety of legal strategies, but mostly fall into two categories — the best-interest of the 
child principle, and parental intent, a new concept for family law.'®
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Courts relying on intent to resolve disputes engendered by reproductive 
technology have failed to delineate the parameters and implications of intent, explains 
Dolgin. Several law review articles, suggesting that intent should become the central tool 
through which to settle disputes involving reproductive technology, have delineated the 
contours of the concept. In each case, intent has been equated with choices made through 
contract negotiations. Thus, the articles urge courts to recognize and enforce contractual 
agreements concerning the creation of families and children. However, courts have 
generally not been willing to do that. Although they have relied on intent, courts have 
failed to address the obvious questions raised by that reliance. Courts have explicitly 
distinguished a party’s intent from the same party’s contractual agreements.'^
Disputing parties tend to rely on biological facts to present their arguments in 
court. Opposing litigants rely on essentially the same biological facts, but dispute the 
moral and existential implications of the facts.'®
The U.S. Constitution is no help in this regard, either. The right to privacy offers 
no guidance in selecting among disputants’ conflicting rights to procreational privacy 
posed by the right to procreate against the right to avoid procreation. Rights o f equal 
significance do not help in considering the emotional stress and physical discomfort, the 
joys o f parenthood, or the anguish of a lifetime of unwanted parenthood.'®
Artificial Insemination 
Artificial insemination has been around since the early 19* century. About 
65,000 children are bom annually in the United States due to artificial insemination. This 
practice shows how the law has regulated this practice following an assimilation period.'"
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First, artificial insemination using the husband’s unfrozen sperm has never been 
an issue with the law. This is a straightforward procedure that does not deal with custody 
or biological issues. However, the same cannot be said about insemination by donor. 
Traditionally, artificial insemination by donor was used in marriage when the male was 
infertile. More recently, it has been used for reducing the risk o f  generic disease and 
gives single women and lesbian couples a chance to have children.
In the first ha lf o f the century, disputes involved questions about the paternity of 
the donor and o f the mother’s husband. Courts responded variously and intensely. Some 
equated artificial insemination with adultery and defined the child as illegitimate.
Others defined the relation between the mother’s husband and the child produced from 
artificial insemination as one of quasi-adoption. Others refused to consider the mother’s 
claim of artificial insemination because the children would be considered illegitimate.
No legislation specifically guided courts in these cases until the mid-1960s.
Early common law cases centered around divorce. In MacLennan v. MacLennan 
(1958), a Scottish case, the court actually deliberated whether artificial insemination by 
donor constituted adultery. Lord Wheatley, the judge, said adultery involves sexual 
intercourse and therefore artificial insemination by donor cannot be adultery. The 
husband was looking for a reason to divorce prior to the age o f “no fault” divorce. Since 
the wife was unwilling to disclose any details of her artificial insemination, the court 
granted the husband a divorce due to the wife’s adultery.^'
Other cases involved the husband’s obligation of custody and financial support to 
a child bom through donor insemination following a divorce. Most cases decided the 
husband must support the child, that he is entitled to visitation, and that no other man
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may adopt the child without his consent. Only one case considered the child illegitimate.
In C.M. V. C.C.. New Jersey Superior Court (1977), a couple was dating and 
planned to marry. They didn’t want to have sex before marriage, but they wanted a child. 
They had a child through artificial insemination, but never got married. Tire man paid 
child support and wanted visitation. The woman denied visitation. A New Jersey court 
said the man was entitled to visitation. The court stated: “C.M. has grown a genuine 
interest in the child; he is a teacher and educationally able to aid his development, and is 
financially capable of contributing to his support.”^
In Doombos v. Doombos (1956), an Illinois county court ruled that donor 
insemination was adulterous even if the husband consented because it was “contrary to 
public policy and good morals.”^
In People v. Sorenson, California Supreme Court (1968), the court ruled that it 
would be “patently absurd” to say that donor insemination constituted adultery. In that 
case, a woman who had received her husband’s written consent to artificial insemination 
subsequently obtained a divorce and declined support under the divorce decree. When 
she became ill and began receiving public support, the state sued her husband for support.
The court held the husband liable for support because he was tlie lawful father, thereby 
preventing the “obvious injustice that would result if a child artificially conceived was 
excluded firom the protection of the law intended to benefit all minors, legitimate or 
illegitimate...In the absence o f legislation prohibiting artificial insemination, the offspring 
of defendant’s valid marriage to the child’s mother was lawfully begotten and was not the 
product of an illicit or adulterous relationship.” '^*
In Gursky v. Gurskv. New York Superior Court (1963), a lower court in New
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York stated that the legislature’s failure to pass a statute legitimizing a child by donor 
insemination evidenced the legislature’s intent that the courts continue to apply the 
historical concept o f illegitimacy. Another, In re Adoption of Anonvmous. New York 
Superior Court (1973), the court criticized this ruling, stating that the child was not bom 
out of wedlock, that the wife did not have an affair outside of marriage, and legislative 
intent is not a basis for court mlings.^ In general, most courts have held that the husband 
is responsible for child support in artificial insemination cases.^"
In 1964, Georgia enacted the first statute directly responsive to the questions 
raised by artificial insemination. This statute stated that children bom through artificial 
insemination using donor sperm would be considered the legitimate children of their 
mother’s husbands if  both spouses have consented in writing. The statute provided that 
only licensed physicians may perform the procedure. Anyone else is guilty o f a felony 
and may be imprisoned for one to five years. Within a short period of time, a majority of 
the states promulgated statutes that regulated artificial insemination. A similar statute in 
Oregon makes it a misdemeanor for a woman to inseminate herself.'^
Many physicians are unwilling to provide such basic infertility treatments as 
artificial insemination to women who are poor or unmarried. A few states have simply 
declared artificial insemination performed without the aid of a physician illegal 
(Connecticut, Georgia, Oklahoma, Idaho, and Oregon).^®
More commonly, the states allow only those women who use physicians to avail 
themselves of statutory protections that prevent the semen donor jfrom seeking parental 
rights, so that women who choose to become pregnant outside the health care system do 
so at their own risk.^ ®
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Several states have enacted laws providing that men who have a disease or defect 
know by them to be transmissible by genes may not be donors. Screening o f donors, 
however, is relatively untouched by statues or by administrative rulings.^"
The Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted by several states with variations in 
language. This Act guarantees equal protection under the law for all children bom of 
artificial insemination. A child whose mother was so inseminated will not be deprived of 
a right to a legal father. The California version goes further, shielding the donor o f semen 
firom any legal-paternal responsibility, but only for married women. Section 5 of the 
Uniform Parentage Act provided that if, under the supervision o f  a licensed physician and 
with the consent of her husband, a wife is artificially inseminated with semen donated by 
a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of 
that child. This means that the semen donor is treated in law as i f  he were not the natural 
father of the resulting child. As an aside, the word “donor” is not entirely accurate 
because the person providing semen usually gets paid.^‘
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have now taken a second try at the 
donor insemination question. The Commissioners drafted the Uniform Status of Children 
o f Assisted Conception Act in 1988, which corrects some o f the problems o f the Uniform 
Parentage Act. The new act defines donor to include an individual who produces sperm 
for assisted conception, regardless o f whether payment is made. The Act declared the 
husband of a married woman to be the child’s father unless a court finds he didn’t consent 
to the procedure. A donor is not a parent o f a child conceived through assisted 
conception. The Act also takes a strange position in the case of lesbians who become 
pregnant through donor insemination. If  the woman’s lover seeks some sort of parental
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rights in the child, the statute is silent about whether or not she can prevail and gain full 
custody/^
In Jhordan C- v. Marv K.. California Court o f Appeals (1986), a donor and a 
mother’s female friend each sought parental rights for the child. Under the Assisted 
Conception Act, the father would have been denied because the donor could not be 
considered the legal father. However, California’s statute did not include artificial 
insemination outside o f marriage. So the court ruled the donor could have visitation 
rights, and the mother’s friend was also granted visitation.^^
In the Interest o f R. C.. Colorado Supreme Court (1989), the court placed 
considerable weight on the preconception intentions o f the parties and indicated what 
would constitute evidence o f such intent (the recipient’s promise the donor would be 
treated as a father, the donor’s purchase of baby equipment, setting up o f a college trust 
fund, assistance at the birth and daily child rearing). However, the court would have 
disallowed any preconception agreement between a donor and a married woman whose 
husband consented to her AID. '^*
In Oregon, a donor seeking parental rights forced the court, in McIntyre v.
Crouch (1989), to declare that the state statute enacted there didn’t apply because the 
semen was not provided through a doctor, which is a misdemeanor under that statute 
because the woman inseminated herself
The disposition o f  frozen sperm was argued in Hechtv. Superior Court.
California Court of Appeals (1993). In this case, a  man wrote in a suicide note that he 
wanted his girlfriend, Deborah Ellen Hecht, to have his child and willed to her 15 vials o f 
his spemi, which he had deposited in a sperm bank a month before his death. Despite
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William Kane’s dying wish, Hecht was unable to use the sperm because she was fighting 
Kane’s two grown children for the right to the sperm. Kane’s children wanted the sperm 
destroyed, arguing the court should prevent the birth o f a child who would never know 
his father and prevent further emotional stress on Kane’s family members. They also 
feared an heir who could claim Kane’s estate.^"
The trial court ordered the sperm destroyed, but the California Court o f Appeals 
vacated the order in 1993. The appellate court held Kane could bequeath an interest in 
the sperm, just as he could bequeath an interest in stock. Still, the court remanded the 
case to the probate court to determine the validity o f Kane’s will. The court case is the 
first to address the issue of whether to recognize property rights in sperm, and could have 
implications for other reproductive material such as embryos.^’
In Vitro Fertilization 
In vitro fertilization, or IVF, is a technique that involves fertilizing an ovum 
outside o f a woman’s body and transplanting the resulting embryo into a women to carry 
the child to term. The woman who gestates the child may or may not be the woman who 
provided the ovum, and any man may be the sperm provider. When a husband’s sperm is 
used to fertilize his wife’s ovum and the wife bears the child, the only problems that are 
likely to arise involve negligence in performing the technique and the question of what to 
do with any unused embryos. Additional issues arise when a third party is involved as a 
provider o f the sperm, ovum, or womb.
IVF is also considered by many to be an experimental technique that should be 
controlled. Many o f the court cases have dealt with custody of the child or embryos.
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liability o f the physician or clinic, and insurance coverage for the procedure, as well as 
other related issues.
The recent use o f frozen embryos has created a whole new round o f litigation and 
legislation dealing with custody issues. There are many unanswered legal questions about 
embryos. Can there be ownership o f embryos? Can they be bought or sold? Can 
embryos be the subject o f experimentation? What is the status o f the embryos when it 
develops? Who should have the custody of the embryos in the event of the couple’s 
divorce?
It seems the legal relationship among donors o f eggs, recipients, and offsprings 
should parallel the relationship of sperm donation. However, sperm donation statutes do 
not generally apply to egg donation since the “sperm” literally came before the “egg” 
historically in terms of development and practice. Just as the husband’s consenting to the 
use of donor sperm assumes the donor’s rearing rights and duties, so does the consenting 
wife (who may be the gestational mother) take on rearing rights and obligations, 
terminating those rights of the donor of the egg.^ ®
These advances in medical technology are forcing courts to consider the scope of 
the right to procreate. In particular, questions that need to be answered are whether 
women are entitled to the aid o f medicine and o f the state in furtherance of their desire to 
procreate. IVF is expensive. Some insurance companies pay for it, others don’t. Courts 
increasingly are accepting insured persons’ arguments that infertility is a health or 
medical problem and that IVF is no longer experimental. As a result, courts are requiring 
insurers, who have not made specific exclusions, to pay for such treatments. This is what 
happened in the case o f Reillv v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wisconsin (1988).^ ®
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Health insurance coverage for infertility procedures has been relatively little 
discussed, although in recent years several appellate courts have faced that issue. In 
Witdraft v. Sundstrand. Iowa Supreme Court (1980), the court initially determined that an 
infertility condition was an illness.'*"
Reproductive technologies also raise interesting questions as to the liability o f the 
person of persons performing the process. In Smith v. Hartigan (1983), the physician 
determined that Mary Smith was unable to conceive because o f irreversibly damaged 
fallopian tubes, and that IVF was the only possible solution for a baby. However, the 
state o f Illinois apparently prohibited the procedure and all parties were fearful o f the 
legal consequences. The statute in question stated that “any person who intentionally 
causes the fertilization of a human ovum outside the body of a living human female shall 
be deemed to have the care and custody of a child.” Plaintiffs argued the statute was 
unconstitutional. The federal district court for the Northern District o f Illinois found no 
case or controversy because the doctor refused to perform the procedure based on his own 
personal interpretation of the statute, and the prospective parents agreed not to prosecute 
the doctor for refusing to perform the procedure.'*'
Couples who are vulnerable need to be informed of the risks and benefits o f IVF 
procedures. In 1992, Congress passed a law directing fertility clinics to report success 
rates. However, that law has not been enforced due to lack o f funding.'*'^
The federal district court in Virginia in York v. Jones Institute 119891 ruled that 
the frozen embryo was property belonging to the couple whose genetic material created it. 
The couple moved the frozen embryo from a Virginia clinic to one in California where 
the couple planned to have it implanted.'*^
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The process o f freezing embryos appears to be banned in certain states, including 
Minnesota, Michigan, and Illinois. Minnesota forbids experimentation on a living human 
conceptus, including those conceived ex utero, unless the experimentation is necessary to 
protect the health or life o f the conceptus or unless scientific evidence has proven the 
experimentation to be harmless.'*'*
In the United States, the use o f embryos is not regulated, and different fertility 
centers use different rules. This contrasts with a country such as Sweden, where the 
government ruled that an embryo may be gestated only by the woman who produced the 
egg, thereby prohibiting embryo donation. Frozen embryos may not be stored more than 
three years. In the United Kingdom, the Waraock Committee recommended that the 
human embryo be treated with “respect” and be afforded some protection in law.'*^
The courts generally deal with disputes among the various parties, and the routine 
IVF procedure continues unobstructed by legal roadblocks. Very few statutes have dealt 
with this issue, even though ethical objections are heard regarding the use of such 
procedures on older women, single women, lesbian women, and so on. Also, ethical 
objections are heard regarding the recent use o f such procedures to determine the sex of 
the child, but there are no laws preventing these types o f procedures.
Surrogate Motherhood 
Surrogate motherhood has gotten most o f the attention regarding the use o f 
different means to have a child. Although surrogate motherhood is not officially a new 
reproductive technology, it is generally included in discussions about the impacts of 
reproductive technologies on society, the law, and the family structure. State legislatures
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have responded more readily on this issue than IVF procedures. Most o f the concerns and 
disputes have centered around contractual agreements, custody issues, adoption parallels, 
and payment for gestational mothers. Other concerns center around the surrogate mother, 
whom some see as vulnerable to exploitation due to poverty.
The presence o f two mothers, gestational and genetic, is forcing judges to 
reconsider how far they are willing to push reliance on the best interests of the child as a 
standard in court disputes. These disputes are not difficult to imagine. The surrogate 
may not want to surrender the child; the father and his wife may not want to accept the 
child; the surrogate may want an abortion, or she may refuse prenatal care, and so on.
Recently, the law has begun to recognize that persons other than biological 
parents may raise claims to custody and visitation. Grandparents and stepparents, as well 
as “psychological” parents may be granted visitation, showing that the law has already 
deviated from a simple biological determinism in deciding who is to be treated as a 
parent."*"
Most third parties have claims due to established social relationships which would 
create instability in a child’s life i f  they were to discontinue. This can’t be said about 
third party gestational mothers. However, a physical relationship exists. Should the 
absence of a genetic tie prevent the consideration of a gestational mother’s claims? In 
many surrogate cases, the gestational mother is also the genetic mother but not the 
intended social mother.
In a 1987 New York Times article, it was reported that a Michigan surrogate 
mother had refused to surrender the twins whom she bore for an Arkansas couple under 
contract, and a Michigan court had temporarily permitted her to retain custody but
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claimed she had been coerced.'*’
In Re Baby Girl, the Kentucky circuit court denied the request o f the husband of 
the surrogate mother to terminate parental rights and to transfer custody o f the newly bom 
child to the biological father. The biological father was not the legal father, for a child 
bom in wedlock is presumed to be the legitimate child of the surrogate mother and her 
husband. The father had not filed the proper application for permission to place or 
receive the child for adoption."*®
In Svrkowski v. Applevard. Michigan Supreme Court (1983), a semen donor filed 
an action alleging that he had reason to believe that the defendant who had been 
artificially inseminated was pregnant with his child. He wanted to be declared the natural 
father and get custody. The defendant surrogate mother did not oppose the petition, but 
the attorney general o f Michigan intervened, saying that the court had no jurisdiction over 
the matter because it involved a surrogate mother contract that was of doubtful validity. 
The Michigan Court o f Appeals agreed with the State that the defendant’s husband who 
had consented to the AID should be deemed the child’s father. “Family living and, more 
specifically, interest in the welfare of the child must continue to be of paramount 
importance to the people o f this state, the court stated."*®
The validity o f the surrogate mother contract was recently upheld in the New York 
decision in Matter o f Babv Girl L.J. (1980). The case involved a natural father and his 
wife, who wanted to adopt a child bom of a surrogate mother. The court admitted moral 
and ethical reservations, but acknowledged the reality of the child’s need to be reared by 
parents and not by the surrogate mother. The adoption was granted.""
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Opinions in these cases also demonstrate disagreement over the role o f financial 
coercion in the use o f  reproductive technologies. The court in the Baby Girl L.J. case 
explained that laws prohibiting payments in connection with adoption were designed to 
keep baby brokers firom coercing expectant mothers or parents with financial inducements 
to give up their child. Courts held that surrogacy does not violate these laws. According 
to the courts, surrogacy and adoption differ because surrogate arrangements are entered 
into before conception, whereas adoption is agreed to afterward. Financial considerations 
may shape a woman’s choice to give up her child for adoption, but the “essential 
consideration is to assist a  person or couple who desperately want a child but are unable 
to conceive one in the customary manner.”"'
In the most famous case. Matter o f  Babv M. New Jersey Supreme Court (1988), 
the court granted custody to the father, David Stem. However, the court refused to 
terminate the parental rights o f the surrogate and biological mother, Mary Beth 
Whitehead. The court declared surrogate motherhood contracts void because the contract 
conflicted with New Jersey law and public policy. The court also said it would consider 
visitation because it was in the best interests o f the child.
The court looked at the two family situations. The Stems’ family life was stable, 
their financial and employment situations were secure. They were committed to the 
baby’s education and well suited to nurture and protect Baby M while encouraging her 
wholesome, independent psychological growth and development. Contrast that situation 
with that of Mary Beth Whitehead, who was unhappily married, financially insecure, 
dishonest, unopen to professional help, and uncommitted to the baby’s education."^
In another case, Noel Keane, a surrogate broker and Michigan attorney, had a deal
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go bad when the baby was bom with severe defects. The parents refused the child, and 
the surrogate mother sued. The child turned out to be the child o f  the surrogate mother’s 
husband, but was infected by the contracting man’s sperm. The United States Court o f 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit resolved the case in favor of the plaintiff. The court found 
that Keane and the other defendants had a special relationship to the mother based on 
their participation in the surrogacy program and their use of the mother in that program. 
Because o f that special relationship, she was entitled to compensation from them.""
The California Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Calvert relied on parental intent to 
distinguish between two women claiming to be a child’s biological mother. The court 
was interested in the intentions o f the disputing parties prior to the birth of the child and 
decided accordingly.
The Baby M case relied on the best interest standard. In deciding the case, the 
court stated that “we grant custody to the father, the evidence having clearly provide such 
custody to be in the best interests o f the infant.” However, the court declared the 
surrogacy contract invalid because o f the “coercion” contract: the natural mother’s 
irrevocable agreement, prior to birth, even prior to conception, to surrender the child to 
the adoptive couple. Such a contract is totally unenforceable in private adoption.”""*
If other states followed the New Jersey Baby M case decision, surrogacy contracts 
would be a thing of the past. The major stumbling block is not the receipt of payment by 
the surrogate mother but the fact that she cannot agree irrevocably before conception to 
terminate her matemal rights and surrender her baby at its birth.""
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Eisenstadt v. 
Baird (1972), had strongly stated that a state statute could not constitutionally prohibit a
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couple desiring to have a child, which would include barring them from entering a 
surrogate parenting arrangement. Some believe that allowing a surrogate mother to 
violate her contract may be unconstitutional because it infringes upon the procreative 
liberty of the infertile couple providing the embryo.
In Surrogate Parenting Inc. v. Commonwealth o f Kentuckv. Kentucky Supreme 
Court (1986), the court held that the surrogate contract did not violate the Kentucky 
statute against baby selling.""
In Gravv. Maxwell. Nebraska Supreme Court (1980), the court held an adoption 
agreement to be unenforceable because an agreement to pay a mother more than the 
“legitimate expenses o f confinement and birth” was against public policy."’
In Doe V. Kellv. Michigan Court o f Appeals (1981), the court had taken a  similar 
view that payment should not be allowed because “the primary purpose o f this money is 
to encourage women to volunteer to be surrogate mothers.”"® State statutes have differed 
on this subject. A Michigan statute, effective in 1988, made surrogacy contracts illegal 
and also made the arranging o f such contracts to be a felony with penalties up to five 
years in prison and a $50,000 fine. However, the contract would be permitted if the 
surrogate mother did not have to decide until after the birth whether she wanted custody 
of the baby or whether she wanted to waive custody and receive payment for giving 
birth."®
Nevada has made commercial surrogacy possible by exempting surrogate 
contracts from the state adoption laws that prohibit payment to natural parents for their 
adoption o f the child. Other states have passed the Uniform Parentage Act that deals with 
surrogate motherhood. Under the Act, court-monitored surrogacy would amount to filing
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all surrogacy agreements with the state, undergoing mandatory counseling, conducting 
evaluations o f the participants’ ability to handle the process, and proving that the wife o f 
the intended couple was infertile or that pregnancy poses a significant risk to her health.""
Some people believe surrogate motherhood is not a good candidate for legislative 
treatment because it affects a very small percentage o f the population. Others see 
surrogacy, at least paid surrogacy, as baby selling, which should be prohibited.
Surrogate mothers are prohibited in many states from receiving compensation for their 
services. Only Arkansas had enacted a specific statute on surrogate mothering.
Otherwise, state statutes relating to adoption practices have been used in the attempted 
regulation of surrogacy. Florida, for example, allows the mother to receive actual 
medical, hospital, confinement, and living expenses. California prohibits payments in 
excess of medical expenses to the mother or adoption agency. Indiana allows payment 
and receipt o f attorney’s fees, medical expenses, reasonable charges by a licensed 
adoption agency, and other court-approved charges. Ohio authorizes the mother to 
receive payment for medical and legal expenses. Utah allows receipt o f actual, 
reasonable medical, hospital, and confinement expenses."'
Surrogacy has been regulated by many states under statutes dealing primarily with 
fetal experimentation, particularly where the fertilization was in vitro as opposed to 
artificial insemination of the natural parent vrithout surrogacy."’
Nebraska has legislatively declared that surrogate motherhood contracts are void, 
as have Indiana, Kentucky, and Louisiana. Only Arkansas and Nevada appear to accept 
such contracts as valid subject to judicial review.""
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Summary
As shown, this review o f  court cases and state statutes reveal conflicts over how 
best to regulate reproductive technologies. This includes conflicts over the relationship 
between reproductive technologies and existing statute statutes, child support, paternity 
rights, and adoption and custody policies.
Reproductive technologies have entered the U.S. courts and state legislatures in a 
variety o f different legal contexts, according to the authors o f “Reproductive 
Technologies and the U.S. Courts.” Their survey revealed that the courts’ main task has 
been to decide whether these technologies conflict with existing statutes. Next, courts 
have dealt with questions of responsibility for child support in conjunction with 
reproductive technologies. Presently, most state laws indicate that the husband o f a 
woman who consents to artificial insemination by donor is the father o f the child so 
conceived, but whether he should pay child support following a divorce has not been 
clear. These laws do not deal well with issues surrounding the paternity o f a child of an 
unmarried women. Other frequent court cases involving paternity revolve around 
surrogate arrangements. The courts also deal with questions related to adoption and 
custody. Their decisions have varied widely in this regard."^ Finally, consumer issues 
such as insurance coverage and liability issues are prevalent today in court cases.
Reproductive technologies are popularly viewed by many as expanding the 
reproductive choices available to women and men. However, other groups such as 
feminists argue that reproductive choice is meaningful only if  the conditions under which 
women make these choices are addressed. They cite a number o f factors that may 
influence women’s choice to use reproductive technologies such as the social
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
59
Stigmatization o f infertility, the high costs of these technologies, and women’s lack of 
knowledge o f the risks associated with them.""
In general, law provides a powerful commentary on the life it regulates. The 
actions o f legislatures and courts provide different vantage points on that life, however. 
According to author Roger Dworkin, legislative statutes usually signal social agreement 
far more than court opinions. Legislation suggests the resolution o f debate while courts 
suggest the terms of debate. Courts often make decisions quickly.""
Decisions about reproductive technologies are made mostly in the courts, where 
there is debate without social agreement. In addition, decisions about these technologies 
are being made without thoughtful consideration or a vision o f the society as a whole. 
Court decisions, then, reflect the confusions and uncertainties o f reproductive 
technologies and society’s inability to provide any broad, consistent response. Cases 
about surrogacy and reproductive technologies reveal, for instance, that courts apparently 
at odds over the resolution of disputes involving assisted reproduction may predicate their 
conflicting decisions on a shared vision o f family. According to author Dolgin, most 
judges have mounted a seemingly unconscious defense o f the traditional view o f  the 
family."’
She explains that some courts have accepted surrogacy contracts and recognized 
intending parents because the correlates of contract seemed to ensure the preservation of 
tradition, at least within specific families. It seems that the confusion centers around a 
general, social ambivalence regarding the expansion of individual choice in the creation 
and operation o f families."®
The responses o f  the law have been challenged dramatically by reproductive
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technologies and surrogacy arrangements, according to Dolgin. First, they challenge the 
notion that the parent-child tie should be founded in love, not in money. In every state o f 
the United States, adoption laws prohibit the exchange of money for a baby. Yet, 
commercial surrogacy arrangements and infertility markets involve the exchange of 
money for gametes, embryos and babies, pursuant to a variety o f contractual agreements.
These new technologies disturb assumptions about parent-child relationships, and 
the fast pace of these technological changes make it difficult for society and the law to 
adapt. Whether a consensus will eventually emerge remains to be seen."®
Achieving some form of broad consensus has been the aim o f several other 
countries. These countries have taken a fairly comprehensive approach in trying to 
resolve the difficult issues related to reproductive technologies. The next chapter 
discusses the various approaches and how they have worked.
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CHAPTER V
THE USE OF COMMISSIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Other countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada have 
taken close looks at the impact o f artificial reproductive technologies on their societies. 
Each country’s approach has been different but has been fairly comprehensive in its 
outlook. The United States, one o f the largest users o f the new reproductive technologies, 
has been much less comprehensive in its approach and outlook. Rather, the United States 
has dealt with complicated reproductive technology issues on a piecemeal basis, 
preferring to use litigation and, to a lesser extent, legislation, rather than discussion and 
decision on a nationwide basis. This chapter examines what other countries have done 
and whether various approaches could be used as a model for the United States.
France
When France first started the use of infertility treatments, it was regarded as a 
private matter. The National Health Service even paid for them. The introduction of 
surrogacy and posthumous insemination, however, made it difficult for public authorities 
to maintain a neutral position. Government officials, therefore, decided that a national 
debate was needed. The debate was promoted in two ways: the organization of a  national 
colloquium and a report providing views of experts and members of the public.'
65
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The colloquium, titled “Genetics, Procreation, and the Law,” was held in Paris in 
January 1985. The debate during these two days centered largely on the question of 
whether legislation was needed. Scientists, lawyers, philosophers, sociologists, and 
members o f the public participated. Four panels discussed different topics: the donation 
and use o f gametes; the freezing of embryos; in vitro fertilization and surrogacy; and 
predictive medicine.
No conclusions were reached following this gathering except that decisions 
should not be left solely to scientists. The requirement for legislation was not felt to be 
great at that time, and a moratorium was proposed. During this period o f legislative 
abstention, however, it was felt that a study should be conducted to find out which issues 
were controversial to French society. This led to a study done by two lawyers and three 
biologists. They were asked to give a  “snapshot” o f opinions from religious and political 
fields as well as the professionals involved. The research showed that reproductive 
medicine brought some real advantages, but it also carried some risks and potential 
drawbacks. To find an adequate balance, specific rules would be required. These rules 
should not come from the medical community, but should also include legal and moral 
opinions. The time and diversity needed to define these ethical principles could be 
carried out by a forum such as a National Ethical Committee.’
By presidential decree in 1983, a National Ethical Committee for Life Sciences 
and Health was created. This advisory body was designed to consider major social issues 
which were limited to ethical questions posed by the development of research. The 
committee is supposed to work as a moral authority, and its advice may be accepted by
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scientists, and may also be influential in the courts and public policy making. The 
committee also serves as a forum of discussion for both professionals and members of the 
public. The 37 members of the committee — consisting o f 25 doctors and scientists, four 
lawyers, three theologians and philosophers, and five persons o f different professions — 
are appointed for two years. Before an issue is discussed before the committee, a 
permanent technical staff prepares two reports: one on the state of science and the other 
on legal and ethical issues.
The committee was widely respected in France because o f its multi-disciplinary 
approach. The committee also found that a common position on artificial reproduction 
could be reached because of an existence in the national culture of general principles on 
which many people could agree. One such principle is that every person is entitled to 
have human rights because he or she is physically a human being. This implies that the 
body is the central point of respect due to the dignity of the human person. The integrity 
of the body, therefore, should not be violated without the consent of the individual 
concerned.
Some decisions the committee made about assisted reproduction include: the birth 
mother is always considered the legal mother, even in cases o f surrogacy; sperm donors 
should not receive payments nor can any paternal rights or responsibilities be established; 
no use can be made o f  frozen gametes and embryos when the members o f  the couple are 
divorced or separated, or when one o f them is dead.
Using the principles as a guide, the committee decided that legal conclusions 
could be drawn in accordance with the French legal system. For this reason, the
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government decided to proceed further by launching a study to see how it might be 
possible to translate into law the general principles o f common morality identified by the 
National Ethical Committee.^
A working group of lawyers was set up to examine the committee’s work under 
the auspices of the Cancel d’Etat, the permanent legal advisory coimcil o f the 
government. The working group held hearings and made visits to research institutes and 
hospitals. In 1988, they concluded that legal regulation was a necessity in this field.
Their four main conclusions were: statute law is better than case law; law is necessary to 
clarify family relationships and to secure public health; the power over man that biology 
gives to scientists is not legitimate and legal; and these matters are of international 
concern which require the adoption of a national law.
The report insisted on some fundamental principles which include: reproductive 
medicine should be considered as a way to remedy infertility; the child has an interest to 
be brought up in a  two-parent family; the right to individual autonomy should be 
recognized but cannot be absolute; the legal status o f the resulting child should be as 
similar as possible to the general status o f children in general; prenatal diagnosis should 
be limited but the consequences of a diagnosis should be left up to the physician and to 
the couple; and a  law is necessary to protect a potential human being from the possible 
risks of scientific manipulation which could become a new form of eugenics.
The working group drafted a bill containing 89 sections and six chapters 
proposing to introduce law reform. The text constantly refers to the general principles 
which govern the human in the Civil Code system and to the concept of human rights.
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The French approach in dealing with reproductive technologies took different 
steps: the encouragement of social debate, the development o f ethical considerations, the 
setting o f principles which could commonly be accepted as a basis for future legislation, 
and the writing o f appropriate statutes. As a result, there was no major social opposition 
and a  new independent authority was allowed to define what was possible social 
agreement in the field of bioethical issues."* However, it looks like no legislation has 
been enacted to date due to the sensitivities of this kind o f legislation.
Australia
The Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In 
Vitro Fertilization was formed in 1982 in the state of Victoria in Australia. The 
committee was established by the Attorney General and Minister o f Health. The 
committee consisted of five men and four women. Three were from the medical 
profession, two from the legal profession, two from the religious community, one a 
schoolteacher and another a social worker. The committee was formed due to public 
awareness o f the issue following the births of “test tube babies” in Australia. The 
committee members interviewed a number of experts in the areas of reproductive 
medicine, infertility counseling, moral philosophy and child psychiatry. The committee 
also held public hearings, solicited comments from the community, and read material 
from a variety o f sources. After three months, the members produced an interim report 
which focused on husband and wives supplying their own gametes for the laboratory 
production of an embryo or embryos. The members unanimously agreed this form of
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procedure was acceptable to the Victorian community. They proposed legislation be 
enacted to provide a system for approval or licensing of hospitals to undertake IVF 
programs. Counseling for prospective patients was mandatory.^
The committee published two other reports, one in August 1983 and another in 
August 1984. The Report on Donor Gametes included some o f the following 
recommendations: the use of donor gametes and donor embryos in IVF programs was 
acceptable; donors o f  gametes should not receive payment other than expenses; 
counseling should be mandatory for donors as well as for infertile couples; 
comprehensive information about donors should be stored in a government-controlled 
Central Registry; legislation should be enacted to establish clearly the relationship of 
father and child, or mother and child, or father and mother and child, when donor gametes 
or donor embryos were used to establish the child, provided it was with the consent o f the 
spouse who made no genetic contribution to the child; and non-identifying information 
should be offered to recipients of gametes or embryos, and to donors about recipients and 
successful pregnancies and live births.
The third report dealt with the freezing and storing o f  embryos, embryo 
experimentation and surrogate motherhood. The committee recommended that freezing 
should be permitted, but only for the couple seeking to establish a family. Each couple 
agreeing to storage was obligated to decide what would happen in the event of an 
accident, death, or divorce. A majority of committee members decided that embryo 
experimentation o f a non-therapeutic kind might be conducted, but only on spare or 
excess embryos produced from patients in an IVF program. All members agreed that
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such experimentation be scrutinized by the Health Commission or by a standing review 
and advisory body that the committee recommended should be established. The 
committee opposed surrogate motherhood o f any kind ^
After allowing for three months o f public comment, the Attorney General 
introduced two legislative meastures based on the committee’s recommendations. As a 
result, the Infertility Act o f  1984 was passed and the Standing Review and Advisory 
Committee on Infertility was formed to advise the Minister o f Health. The eight-member 
committee was formed in 1985 and represents medicine, social work, law, philosophy, 
teaching, and religious communities. The committee has held many formal meetings, 
including consultations with embryologists, clinicians, counselors, and infertile couples. 
The committee has met with many government officials and has held various 
symposiums.
The Victorian legislation has served as a model for other states in Australia. 
However, the nation has not adopted any uniform legislation, although a  National 
Bioethics Consultative Committee was established in 1988.’
Canada
In 1982, the Attorney General o f Ontario asked the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission to study the legal issues related to the practices of artificial reproduction, 
including surrogate motherhood. The commissioners, all lawyers, decided the best way 
to tackle this project was to appoint an advisory body to study the issue and make 
recommendations to the commission. The advisory body was made up o f doctors.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
72
philosophy professors, a social worker, a family court Judge and a tax accountant. The 
commission solicited comments from the public through the newspaper and had 
numerous meetings with religious organizations, hospitals, medical schools, IVF 
practitioners in Canada, and other medical practitioners.
The commissioners discovered that three general orientations might be applied in 
developing legal responses to artificial reproduction and surrogate motherhood. One 
approach basically facilitates non-judgmental laws through which individuals may plan, 
negotiate and complete their reproductive activities according to their own goals, 
confident that the legal consequences they intend will actually follow. A regulatory 
approach establishes one of several levels o f regulations of the ways in which individuals 
may act to achieve their own and other people’s reproductive preferences. The third 
approach legally prohibits, denies or frustrates any pursuit of a reproductive deviation 
from procreation within marriage or a stable domestic union. Following a study of the 
two-volume, 390-page report prepared by the advisory board, the commissioners favored 
a hybrid approach. They found that different techniques of assisted reproduction 
warranted different legal approaches. The commissioners decided that surrogate 
motherhood warranted a high level o f  regulation.*
The commissioners were guided by a basic governing principle that “there should 
be no intervention, in any form, unless the public interest is likely to be threatened or 
firustrated by the absence of some form or degree of regulation.”^
The commissioners decided many artificial reproduction matters were already 
subject to regulation through the College o f Physicians and Surgeons o f Ontario. They
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also decided that comprehensive new legislation was unnecessary since many 
recommendations could be implemented under existing legislative structures affecting 
public hospitals, child welfare, and birth registration. Surrogate motherhood was the 
exception. Surrogate motherhood was seen as an option that could not be eliminated or 
suppressed, but controlled. Their approach was to have participants in surrogacy 
arrangements go before a family court judge. The judge would look at a number of issues 
and then decide whether to approve the arrangement. The judge would have to be 
satisfied that all parties acted freely, with complete information and counseling.
Although the report has never been legislated, it has been influential. For 
example, birth registration no longer requires the paternity of a child. Also, IVF clinics 
can now act with legal confidence to treat patients.
Some women’s groups, fearful that Ontario would be a “mecca” for those seeking 
artificial reproduction, recommended that a Canada-wide study be conducted. The 
federal government o f Canada appointed a Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies in 1982. The commission was headed by a leading geneticist at the 
University o f British Columbia.
The commission, representing diverse groups of society, spent a few years 
gathering information and discussing how new reproductive technologies should be used 
in Canada. They held public hearings, read briefs, set up toll-free telephone lines, and 
conducted surveys. In all, more than 40,000 people were involved in this work in some 
fashion. More than 300 researchers at institutions across the country conducted research 
projects in many disciplines, including the social sciences, ethics, law, and medicine.
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The Commission issued a final report called “Proceed With Care.” The report 
cites three main considerations: a set o f explicit ethical principles, the values o f 
Canadians, and a conviction that a medical procedure that is offered as a service must be 
proven safe and effective.
The report criticizes some of the standards and guidelines recommended by 
various professional associations. It stated that some practices are even dangerous, such 
as donor insemination using sperm from donors who have not been tested for HIV.
Some are harmful to the interests of the children bom through the use o f  various 
technologies, such as the lack of records kept on their origins. “We found insufficient 
emphasis on the prevention o f infertility. We found some discriminatory practices in 
access to services, some clinics preparing to carry out procedures to allow surrogacy, and 
some commercial clinics existing to treat sperm to allow sex selection.” The report stated 
that some procedures are being offered as treatments without good evidence that they are 
effective, when they should be offered only in research trials.
The report notes:
It is clear that the situation with regard to the use of new reproductive 
technologies needs to be addressed: the issues will not go away — in fact, the field 
is growing, and potential uses are expanding...We conclude that government, as 
the guardian of the public interest, must act to put boundaries around the use of 
new reproductive technologies, and must put in place a system to manage them 
within these boundaries, not just for now, but, equally important, in an ongoing 
way."
The first recommendation is to enact legislation that prohibits, with criminal 
sanctions, several aspects o f new reproductive technologies, “such as using embryos in 
research related to cloning, the fertilization o f  eggs from female fetuses for implantation.
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the sale o f eggs, sperm, zygotes, or fetal tissues, and advertising for, paying for, or acting 
as an intermediary for preconception (surrogacy) arrangements.” The second 
recommendation is to establish a regulatory and licensing body called the National 
Reproductive Technologies Commission that will be responsible for the licensing of new 
reproductive technologies. This commission would be composed o f 12 members, 
representing a broad range of experiences and perspectives. Women would make up at 
least half, and would also include the perspectives o f those with disabilities, those who 
are infertile, and those who are members of racial minorities. A  range of expertise would 
be represented, including reproductive medicine, ethics, law, and social sciences."
The five areas o f responsibility for such a commission would deal with the 
following areas: sperm collection, storage, and distribution, and the use of assisted 
insemination services; assisted conception services, including egg retrieval and use; 
prenatal diagnosis research involving human zygotes; and the provision of human fetal 
tissue for research or other specified purposes.
License hearings would be open to the public, and the commission would have the 
following regulatory authority: license, set standards and monitor practice; collect, 
evaluate, store, and disseminate information; consult, help coordinate, and facilitate 
intergovernmental cooperation in the field; and monitor future technologies and practices 
and set policies for them. A subcommittee would deal with infertility prevention.
The report states that a central goal of the recommendations is to enable 
individual Canadians to make personal decisions about their involvement with the 
technologies, confident in the knowledge that mechanisms are in place to assess their
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safety and effectiveness and to consider their ethical, legal, and social implications. 
“Individuals have a responsibility to inform themselves as fully as possible before 
making such decisions, but government, on behalf o f citizens, has a responsibility to 
ensure that inappropriate and unethical use o f technology is prohibited and that the 
procedures and support necessary for informed decision making are in place.”"
The report notes that the proposed framework would be a beginning, but 
leadership and cooperation among all members of society, particularly government 
officials and professionals involved with reproductive technologies, would be needed.
In the report’s conclusion, it states:
The reasons for such action are compelling: the potential for harm to individuals 
and the need to protect the vulnerable interests o f individuals and society. 
Adopting our recommendations will enable this protection, but will also allow 
scientific knowledge to be used to better the lives of many Canadians. 
Implementing the blueprint will demonstrate that we care about each other’s well­
being and recognize collective values with respect to the importance people attach 
to having children. At the same time, it will ensure only ethical and accountable 
use of technology is made, and demonstrate that Canadians have wisdom, 
humanity, and compassion in the way they choose to use technology.'"*
In July 1995, the Canadian government announced a moratorium on highly
questionable reproductive practices. In early 1996, the government announced the
membership o f the Advisory Committee on the Interim Moratorium on Reproductive
Technologies. The goal of the committee is to track the development o f emerging new
reproductive and genetic technologies and identify other highly questionable practices
that warranted inclusion in the moratorium. The committee is composed o f 13 members
with expertise in women’s health, bio-ethic, reproductive medicine, minority rights and
religion as well as consumer, children and ethno-cultural issues. The moratorium is the
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first step in the development of a permanent regime for managing the application of new 
reproductive and genetic technologies."
On June 14, 1996, Canadian Health Minister David Dingwall introduced 
legislation prohibiting 13 unacceptable uses o f new reproductive and genetic technologies 
and released a  position paper setting out the federal government’s proposed policy on the 
management o f new reproductive technologies, including a  proposed regulatory 
component.
Under the proposed Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, the 
following practices would be prohibited: sex selection for non-medical purposes; buying 
and selling o f eggs, sperm, and embryos, including their exchange for goods, services or 
other benefits, but excluding the recovery o f expenses incurred in the collection, storage, 
and distribution o f  sperm, ova, and embryos for persons other than a donor; germ-line 
genetic alteration; ectogenesis (maintaining an embryo in an artificial womb); cloning of 
human embryos; creation o f animal-human hybrids; retrieval of sperm or eggs firom 
cadavers or fetuses for fertilization or implantation, or research involving the maturation 
o f sperm or ova outside the human body; commercial preconception or “surrogacy” 
arrangements’ transfer o f embryos between human and other species; the use o f human 
sperm, eggs or embryos for assisted human reproduction procedures or for medical 
research without the informed consent o f  the donor; research on human embryos later 
than 14 days after conception; creation o f embryos for research purposes only; offer to 
provide or offer to pay for prohibited services. The rationale used to prohibit these 
practices is that they pose serious risks to human health and safety. They included
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practices that commercialize reproduction and are contrary to the principles of human 
dignity, respect for life and protection o f the vulnerable.
The federal government, following consultations with stakeholders, also plans to 
propose legislation on governing acceptable practices o f  the new reproductive 
technologies. This would include in vitro fertilization, donor insemination, use o f fetal 
tissue, storage and donation or zygotes, and embryo research.
The proposed regulatory component would permit any province or territory that 
wishes to do to develop its own regulatory regime on an equivalency basis."
The United Kingdom 
Responding to the public’s deep concern over the lack of control of reproductive 
technologies, the British government set up the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilization and Embryology (the Wamock Committee) in 1982. The committee’s 
mandate was “to consider recent and potential developments in medicine and science 
related to human fertilization and embryology; to consider what policies and safeguards 
should be applied, including consideration o f the social, ethical, and legal implications of 
these developments; and to make recommendations.. ’
In June 1984, the committee reported back to the government. Those 
recommendations included the following: IVF should continue to be available subject to 
licensing and inspection, and within the National Health Service; that the placing of a 
human embryo in the uterus o f another species for gestation should be a criminal offense; 
that no live human embryo derived firom IVF may be kept alive beyond 14 days after
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
79
fertilization; that a proposed licensing body promulgate guidance on what types of 
research would be unethical under any circumstances.
Following the publication of two government papers on the committee’s findings, 
the Human Fertilization and Embryology Bill was introduced in 1989 and received 
approval in 1990.
The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act is one of the most comprehensive 
statutes concerning reproductive technology anywhere in the world. The statute further 
abolishes the status o f illegitimacy for a child and provides that a husband or unmarried 
partner be considered the father of a child bom from a woman who underwent donor 
insemination. Abolishing the illegitimacy provision o f previous laws was a major step 
forward for British law. The law also states that the woman who carries the child is to be 
treated as the mother o f the child. As for surrogacy, the act renders criminal any act 
designed to establish a surrogacy arrangement if that arrangement is made on a 
commercial basis. Advertising for surrogacy arrangements also is a criminal offense.
This provision is designed to impact agencies who make a profit by bringing together 
infertile couples with women willing to act as surrogate mothers."
The statute also set up the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, known 
as the Licensing Authority. Its function is to oversee embryo research and infertility 
treatment in the United Kingdom, to grant licenses to those working in the field, and to 
withhold or revoke licenses from those who do not uphold the standards mandated by the 
Licensing Authority.
The statute also provides for controlled embryo research. One major provision.
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for example, bars any research or destruction o f any embryo created in vitro to take place 
after 14 days from the completion o f the process o f fertilization. If any embryo exists at 
that stage it must either be implanted into a woman for gestation or immediately be 
destroyed. Research before 14 days will be permitted only i f  it is necessary to use a 
human embryo for the proposed research.’®
One criticism of the report and the statute is that no consideration is given to 
resource allocation. This has been seen as a way to avoid a controversial aspect of the 
new technologies, the discussion o f which would have created considerably more 
controversy because tougher decisions would have to be made.’ '
Italy
Reproductive technologies are not regulated by law in Italy. Due to large differences of 
opinion concerning the nature o f  the family and of reproductive liberty, all o f the bills 
introduced to address these matters have failed to pass the Italian Parliament. However, 
the discussion among bioethicists has grown, particularly on such issues as procreative 
rights and the status o f the embryo.
The National Committee for Bioethics has been considering reproductive 
technologies since 1991, and issued recommendations in 1994. Those recommendations 
include: practices of artificial reproduction inspired by racial prejudices should be 
banned; the practice o f using gametes or embryos for artificial reproduction without the 
interested parties’ consent should be prohibited; any commercial or industrial exploitation 
of gametes, embryos, of fetal tissues should be banned; embryo splitting, cloning, and
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ectogenesis with the object of procreation should be forbidden; producing embryos solely 
for scientific purposes should be forbidden.
These recommendations were unanimous but did not follow from a common 
understanding o f the nature of the human embryo. Some members believe the human 
embryos should be treated as a person from the moment o f conception while others 
believe the embryo cannot be a person, at least until the 14''' day of its development.
There has been general agreement that it is best for the baby to be conceived and 
raised by a heterosexual couple in a  deep and loving relationship, but not all members 
believe that is always the case. Most members believe that access to artificial 
reproduction should be denied to women who are postmenopausal, to homosexual 
couples, and to single women or widows. Others prefer to ban donation or sale of 
gametes. A third group suggested a moratorium on postmenopausal pregnancies until 
more is known about their psychosocial consequences. All members agree that contract 
pregnancy is inadvisable.
The commission also recommends that all centers practicing artificial 
reproduction should be regulated, have consistent policies, and publish their rates of 
success and the inherent risks for each technique. Every new protocol for artificial 
reproduction should be subjected to approval by an independent ethics committee.”
Summary
Each o f these countries has acknowledged to some extent the importance of 
grappling with this important topic on a societal level. While the United States
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understands the importance of the topic and its potential impact on society, it is 
unwilling, for whatever reason, to take the important step of forming a national response 
to these issues.
One problem cited in the United States is the difficulty in achieving consensus on 
these issues and whether consensus is desirable in the first place. Some say it is 
preferable to live in a  society where each person can do what he or she wants within 
reason while others argue that more control is needed for consumer protection and other 
reasons. The next chapter looks at the concept of consensus and how it might be 
achieved.
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CHAPTER VI
A LOOK AT CONSENSUS AND COMMISSIONS 
Many o f the books and articles on assisted reproduction emphasize the need to 
achieve consensus on this issue before moving ahead with more permanent techniques 
such as the adoption o f legislation or regulations. However, many agree that consensus 
on controversial issues is difficult to achieve. All one needs to do is take a close look at 
the abortion issue to see that proven. So the question is whether consensus is necessary 
and appropriate to move forward on this issue. This question has intrigued many 
scholars, some of whom believe consensus is neither desirable nor achievable.
Some scholars question whether it is possible to achieve moral consensus on such 
an issue as artificial reproduction or even whether it is necessary. One subject expert has 
written:
Consensus is usually valued and preferred because it is psychologically 
comforting and politically useful. However, from a philosophical point o f view 
its benefit to individuals or groups should not be examined, but its moral 
authority...Consensus has a claim to moral authority only when it is the result of a 
rational communicative process aimed at inter-subjective understanding and a just 
balancing o f interests.'
H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., from the Center for Ethics, Medicine and Public Issues 
at the Baylor College o f Medicine in Houston, Texas, argues in the same book. The 
Concept of Moral Consensus, that if a person can live with rights to privacy, that person
85
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can live without a moral consensus regarding the use o f human reproductive 
technologies. He claims it is useful to have as much common agreement as possible to 
avoid social discord, and there will be many areas in which the use of commissions for 
public discussions will allow a significant majority to be established. He also adds there 
v/ill be a significant scope of issues with respect to baud, failure to make proper 
disclosures, etc., to which societies should turn to protect individuals, whatever their 
moral interests or concerns with reproduction might be. However, he argues that 
individuals should be free to use or not use these technologies as long as those who 
disagree are not constrained to collaborate with them. Also, individuals should be 
allowed to voice their opposition to these technologies as they see fit.’
Bioethics and Consensus 
In bioethics, there is a history o f skepticism regarding the authority o f experts. 
Many believe experts should not be given free rein on important issues. Therefore, the 
idea of consensus is the solution to ensure the constraint o f expert opinion on moral 
questions. Consensus implies a common or shared sense o f  things. The scientist, or 
expert, may have a vote but it is a group decision. Consensus then becomes the moral 
authority, meaning no individual can have moral authority. Western culture, however, 
denies that consensus on moral questions has any validity in itself. ’
According to Jonathan D. Moreno, author of Deciding Together: Bioethics and 
Moral Consensus, consensus processes have an important role in bioethics. American 
society as a whole relies heavily on panels composed, in large part, of technical experts.
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Emerging questions o f  values in the life sciences have been treated in the same way. As a 
result, both the institution o f bioethics and the individuals who are considered experts in 
the field have become closely identified with consensus in the formulation of societal 
responses to ethical issues in medicine and the life sciences. Policy-making commissions 
include government bodies such as the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research and the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research."*
In a pluralistic society such as the United States, consensus is generally regarded 
as highly desirable. Frequently, there are appeals to consensus in controversial matters. 
The Western philosophical tradition, however, is divided on this issue. While this 
tradition is highly skeptical of the tendency of consensus to curb criticism and dissent, it 
also relies on consensus to help strike the balance between individual self-expression and 
societal functioning, according to Moreno.* Those who strive to find a common ground 
between individualism and socialism often call themselves communitarians, emphasizing 
the importance of common interests and responsibilities as a basis for novel means to 
manage difficult social problems, says Moreno.*
Since the early 1970s, “there has been a consensus about bioethical methodology 
in that one can infer a discrete set of principles firom various moral theories.” Those 
principles, which can be applied to particular cases, are autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and justice. This set o f principles is one in which most participants in 
bioethical debate have found they can rally."
Criticism of these principles comes from various sources. Some say they are too
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broad or even too narrow. Others prefer a case-based approach, and still others prefer a 
unified theoretical approach. Insisting on a particular moral theory has been by far the 
least popular option in bioethics. One of the features that distinguishes moral philosophy 
and applied ethics is the latter’s rejection o f any single theory, according to Moreno.*
Some feminists reject the “principles” approach in addressing human problems 
because it is too rigid and masculine. Rather than using principles and rules, some 
feminists argue that it would be better to look to procedures that will yield the 
arrangement that is most satisfactory to all those who stand to gain or lose by the 
outcome.
Moreno then discusses the various distinctions made regarding various views of 
consensus. For example, there are those who distinguish between procedural and 
substantive consensus. Procedural consensus is when there is agreement about the rules 
or methods that will be followed in resolving actual or possible conflicts about 
substantive matters. Substantive consensus is agreement with one o f a number o f 
alternative and conflicting points of view.
Others distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive consensus. Descriptive 
consensus is a sociological account of the moral views of a particular group, and 
prescriptive consensus is in a philosophical or theological text that commends a particular 
point of view on a moral question. In either case it is sensible to ask whether there is 
merit in the view that is held by a large number o f people or that is defended by argument 
or appeal to authority. Consensus ethics is usually thought to be a variation of descriptive 
ethics.’
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There is also a distinction made between process and product in consensus, 
although this is not as big a  distinction now because many believe the process by which a 
belief is attained is commonly used in defense of the project, which is the belief itself."
Finally, there are the distinctions made between consensus and compromise, an 
important point for philosophers who object to products resulting from negotiation 
between fixed views. Consensus involves reaching agreement on one of a number o f  
theoretically available compromises. Compromise suggests that parties to a controversy 
have started with fixed preferences. Consensus suggests an openness to points of view.
At a deeper level, consensus has the potential for participants to change as a result o f  the 
process, achieving perspectives unknown to them before. By contrast, compromise 
implies at most a deeper appreciation o f one’s pre-existent concerns.
Moreno cites abortion as an issue in which consensus seems beyond grasp, and 
the best that can be done is to achieve a stable compromise. This is because the parties 
have entered the situation with fixed views that are amenable to modification only at the 
margins. This is what is meant when it is said that an ethical issue has become 
politicized, since individuals are wedded to their positions. Many bioethical issues, while 
containing some political elements, have not been captured by those elements in the 
public debate."
A Liberal, Diverse Society and Consensus
Bioethics relies on the nexus o f  autonomy and consensus, according to Moreno.
In American society individuals are free to pursue their own vision of the good life
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(autonomy) and to enter into common agreements about such a vision (consensus).
The government may not dictate any particular vision o f the good life, nor may it 
use its police power to enforce it. The moral authority of consensual arrangements 
derives from the rightful autonomy of the individual, which is an ethical value that 
deserves to be respected. So long as a group respects the general principles of liberalism, 
its view of the good life is entitled to respect. This is the essence of the political rationale 
for the authority o f consensus in a liberal society.”
In a diverse society, this allows subgroups the freedom to pursue their own view 
o f particularized substantive moral consensus, and each of them must in turn grant that 
freedom to other groups. However, differences do arise in practice, and those must be 
ameliorated for a  complex, modem society to function, states Moreno."
Some argue that the liberal state is not a level playing field since the government 
has an interest in the citizenry. The question o f the neutrality o f the government is 
important in the discussion of national ethics commissions because the group could be 
seen as a mere manifestation of state interests, which would reduce moral consensus to 
political consensus.
Another kind o f criticism is that liberal neutrality may be genuine, suggesting that 
no principled view of the good life is possible, and hence no consensus is achievable. 
Because any conception o f the good life is as valid as another, consensus can only be a 
fleeting association with no foundation, observes Moreno. Since liberal society cannot 
validate a particular substantive moral consensus, there is no basis for explaining why the 
rest o f society should accept this consensus from a group such as an ethics panel."
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John Rawls is concerned with the idea o f achieving “overlapping consensus,” 
which means the combination o f  two ideas that are central to his idea of justice as 
fairness, “o f society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the 
next.” The first idea is that o f  citizens cooperating as free and equal persons. The second 
is that o f a society regulated by a political conception o f justice, a well-ordered society.
A framework that includes opposing doctrines of the good can be the object of an 
overlapping consensus so long as the regime is just, which means ensuring the fair 
treatment o f individuals."
John Rawls invokes the idea of overlapping consensus to suggest that the 
members o f a pluralistic society will agree on some ideas and values but will not all agree 
on the same ones. Rawls believes it is often prudent to refrain from attempts to gain 
social agreement on certain intractable controversies, such as abortion."
To that end, Moreno states that bioethical principles can be the enduring objects 
of an overlapping consensus. The exact principles that are the objects o f an overlapping 
consensus, and the extent to which they are more or less articulate, depends to a great 
extent on the context in which they are being entertained.”
Ethics Commissions and Moral Authority
Ethics commissions must produce decisions or recommendations that are valid 
expressions of moral consensus in a pluralistic society. Is it possible for these panels’ 
conclusions to have moral authority? It is possible if the group’s consensus upholds 
liberal values such as respect for the personal autonomy o f those who disagree, and a
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willingness to consider alternative points of view. I f  that occurs, some believe the panel’s 
consensus has all the moral authority that a deliberative process can be accorded in a 
liberal society. Liberalism does not require that a  small group o f decision makers agree 
with the society in detail, but it does demand agreement with the general conditions that 
govern the conduct o f this process.
To understand whether this has been achieved, one needs to look at how 
consensus-based panels operate. Do panel members value mutual respect, openness to 
alternative points of view, and a willingness to entertain unpopular views? The principles 
that are the objects o f an overlapping consensus are in a continual tug with judgments 
about the ethical issues with which panels are confronted. Each undergoes continual 
modification in light o f the other. At some point they reach a balance.
Extending moral consensus into new and controversial territory opens up 
problems about values being less stable than is desirable from the standpoint of 
overlapping consensus. A panel’s interpretation of a  principle beyond what was precisely 
intended by the society’s moral consensus is often an important facet o f  a panel’s 
mission. Since society as a v/hole cannot be expected to consider each new case or 
problem, some subset o f members o f the society must do so. This social need is exactly 
the reason why many practices in the institution of bioethics exist, including review by 
individual ethics panels as well as consultants. There must be some systematic effort to 
extend the consensus of a pluralistic and technologically innovative society.**
Diversity o f representation is normally thought to be an essential feature o f  ethics panels. 
Ethics panels represent society in a deliberative sense rather than in legislative sense.
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They do not represent the views o f constituents, but they do have value disposition 
reasonably similar to those of the community. Deliberations about issues should 
represent the more general and abstract value consensus of the wider community while 
guarding against the uncritical embrace of its more specific values. The panel should be 
willing to gather facts, hear fi-om concerned parties, consider the wisdom o f relevant 
extant policies, and willingly entertain reasonable appeals, according to Moreno.*®
The force o f a  panel’s deliberations is persuasive, which is the point often made 
by proponents of ethics commissions. Some panels are empowered for a consultative 
role. The results o f those deliberations will only have force if  they help to forge an 
institutional consensus, according to Moreno.-**
Government Commissions 
Government commissions have played an important role in public policy. The 
Royal Commission on Poor Laws is seen as the first ethics commission. The British 
commission, which ran from 1832-34, proposed reforms in the British welfare system.
In the 20'*' century, several U.S. presidents have favored presicjential commissions. 
President Theodore Roosevelt appointed six, including a Country Life Commission that 
investigated the needs o f farm families. President Herbert Hoover appointed several 
commissions to bring scientific knowledge to bear on matters o f government. In the 
1960s and 1970s, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and the 
President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy were formed.^*
The United States has a history of forming advisory boards, commissions and
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
94
ethical committees to look at tough, controversial issues. Often, though, their scope is 
limited. Ethics committees at hospitals, for example, often look at specific cases, not 
general issues. The federal government, since the early 1970s, has assigned panels, task 
forces and commissions to look at difficult issues, particularly scientific and medical 
advances. Their effectiveness is often debated. One person, who has served on several of 
these panels, says these commissions, boards, or panels ofter several advantages over 
courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies, including greater flexibility and more 
extensive analysis in approaching complex social dilemmas. Many also have successful 
track records o f  reaching consensus in their advice and recommendations in many 
instances.^
James F. Childress, a University of Virginia professor, has analyzed a panel 
assigned to look at whether the U.S. government should provide federal funds to pursue 
research on the treatment of various diseases such as Parkinson’s Disease, by using tissue 
from deliberately aborted fetuses. Although the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
Research Panel eventually concluded that the government should use federal funds, the 
Secretary o f the Department of Health and Human Services decided to uphold the 
moratorium in 1989. Some researchers at the federally-funded National Institute of 
Health (NIH), in the late 1980s, wanted to experiment with the use of aborted fetal tissue 
on patients with Parkinson’s Disease. The NIH had experimented with these tissues in 
the past, until a moratorium was placed on the use o f federal funds for this purpose until 
an advisory panel looked into the issue, is
The Assistant Secretary o f Health and Human Services assigned to the panel ten
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legal and ethical questions that had to be addressed. The panel, headed by a retired 
federal judge, met in 1988 to hear testimony from more than 50 invited speakers and 
more than 15 representatives o f public interest groups. The panel concluded that it is 
“acceptable public policy” for federal funds to be used for this purpose as long as some 
appropriate guidelines or safeguards are in place. They particularly noted the need to 
separate as much as possible the pregnant woman’s abortion decision from her decision 
to donate fetal tissue. They also recommended that women could not be paid for 
donating fetal tissue, nor could a womain designate a certain patient as a recipient o f this 
tissue. This report was submitted to the Advisory Committee to the Director o f NIH and 
representatives o f  the National Advisory Council to NIH. The Advisory Committee 
unanimously accepted the report and recommended the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services lift the moratorium. At the same time, four out o f 21 members o f  the panel 
published dissenting reports.
One question that needed to be answered was whether an induced abortion is of 
moral relevance to the decision to use human fetal tissue for research. Would an answer 
to this question provide any insight on whether and how this research should proceed? 
After much debate, the panel answered 18 yes and 3 no.^ '* Childress concludes that the ten 
questions posed by the Assistant Secretary constrained the discussions and linked them 
too closely to the question of abortion. While observers noted the panel took a 
consensual approach, this professor states in his analysis that this effort may have been 
costly in terms o f the quality and richness of the report. Too much time was spent trying 
to find words that everyone could agree with, at least for most of the panelists.^
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Public opinion was not considered by the panel members to any great extent, 
although these panels are often seen as reflecting the views o f society as a whole. 
Childress concludes that the appeal to consensus may have stifled a richer debate on the 
issue, which could have been more meaningful in the long run. In the end, the report was 
rejected, a rare occurrence
Carl Wellman, a philosophy professor from Washington University in St. Louis, 
Missouri, disagrees that some form o f consensus is not achievable, but he believes that 
absolute consensus is too much to hope for in this country. “The best we can reasonably 
hope for is a widespread, fairly weak acceptance o f a few low-level moral principles 
applicable to technical interventions in human reproduction.”-^  The 14-day rule for 
experiments on embryos is an example. He believes that this level o f agreement is 
sufficient for the purposes of legislation, adjudication, and the law as a whole.
Regarding legislation, he believes it should reflect a compromise between the diverse 
preferences and interests o f members o f a democratic society. He argues that the legal 
validity of any statute does not depend upon moral grounding; its enactment will require 
a compromise between the legislators and their constituents. He recognizes, however, 
that compromise is not consensus. Typically, it involves trade-offs between what one 
wants and undesirable alternatives. However, he argues that legislation may be 
preferable to judicial decisions because o f the tendency forjudges to integect their own 
beliefs and attitudes into the decision-making process without benefit o f public input.
He says legal reasoning can succeed if  it is part o f larger moral discourse which 
can lead to modest moral consensus. This requires rational argumentation in which
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different moral viewpoints are confronted with each other, resulting in a better 
understanding o f different points o f view.^®
Some social scientists say a commission could give added legitimacy to social 
action, could sanction a delay in government action on a controversial matter, and could 
recommend unpopular policies or build public support for new policies.
In 1979, the National Commission for the Protection o f Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research issued an important document, popularly referred to 
as The Belmont Report. The commission was formed five years earlier by an act of 
Congress. The commission, in its report, articulates three ethical principles intended to 
provide an “analytical framework that will guide the resolution o f ethical problems 
arising from research involving human subjects. The principles — respect for persons, 
beneficence and justice — each represents the essence of long-standing moral traditions. 
These principles were part o f an evolution o f moral thought from various quarters.^®
This integrated and cooperative group pursued its work in a spirit o f mutual 
respect, while at the same time its members did not shrink from identifying and defending 
points of disagreement, according to Moreno. However, it was not always able to exert 
its authority on the agency it was created to advise, the Department o f Health, Education 
and Welfare. On several occasions, the Secretary either delayed his response to several 
regulations proposed by the Commission or ignored them entirely.
Consensus building often requires more than crystallizing professional opinion; it 
also mustl galvanize public opinions in order to put pressure on public officials to respect 
the commission’s authority, according to Moreno.**
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The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research has been very influential. This commission 
completed its work in 1983. The membership of the commission rotated and had a strong 
drive toward consensus. The Executive Director, Alexander Morgan Capron, said that 
only abortion was so laden with fixed positions that the Commission’s consensus process 
would have been frayed by an effort to select a barely acceptable compromise, if  one 
were available.
Capron noted: “Rather than having harmful effects, the drive for consensus seems 
to have had a beneficial effect - it encouraged the commissioners to seek the common 
ground that best expresses the moral insights and values o f  Americans today, in light of 
our shared, albeit not uniform, religious and philosophical traditions.” One of the 
commission’s volumes of work, “Securing Access to Health Care,” has had little impact 
on the public debate. Some have criticized this as a good example of the futility of 
superficial consensus. By the time the commission members started discussing this issue, 
eight members of the commission were replaced, requiring the “process of reasoning 
together to be restarted with newcomers.” Also, there seemed to be disagreement among 
staff members and commission members, resulting in a compromised conclusion.**
The interests of political leaders and society dovetail in the work of national ethics 
commissions. Both are served when a previously imrecognized consensus can be 
established as part of social policy. Also, there are few risks involved in forming a panel 
to deal with morally problematic areas. Although a delayed response might aggravate the 
situation, the purpose of building consensus is hard to criticize.
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In 1993, the U.S. Congress’s Office o f  Technology Assessment published a report 
call “Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy.” Working with an advisory panel of 
bioethicists, the Office o f Technology Assessment summarized the historic experience o f 
government ethics commissions with an eye toward the question o f whether another one 
should soon be established and if so, how it should be organized.
The report states: “Successful commissions were relative free of political 
interference, had flexibility in addressing issues, were open in their process and 
dissemination o f findings, and were comprised of a diverse group o f individuals who 
were generally free o f  ideology and had wide ranging experience.”**
The report emphasizes that commissions should not be burdened with a mandate 
that includes issues likely to be a priori divisive, such as abortion, and that suitable 
funding would enable a staff of professional bioethicists to assess particular points of 
view in a detached manner. It also urged that the structure o f a commission should 
follow from its scope and issues, since a standing body would be suitable for some 
purposes, a term-limited body for others.
The report encourages Congress to appoint another commission noting: “For 
nearly four years — the longest period of time since bioethics burgeoned as a discipline - 
the federal government has been without a formal forum that addresses bioethical issues. 
In fact, a full operational body has not existed in over a decade.” **
In reviews o f  ethics commissions, some observations and criticisms have been 
made. One person notes that morality requires the presentation of disparate views. 
Consensus renders dissent less obvious. Others disagree, stating that consensus among
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commission members is essential because a commission has only the power of 
persuasion. In any case, many agree that the public should have access to information 
about how consensus is reached. Some believe the primary function o f commissions is to 
preserve social peace, not to serve disinterested intellectual goals. Ethics commissions 
are at least a mechanism for reducing conflict about moral questions, and perhaps 
achieving a social consensus. The diversity of viewpoints within the society must be 
recognized in some way by the commission, also. “The justifiability o f  a commission’s 
conclusions depend, at a minimum, on whether they can be sanctioned by principles that 
are objects o f a  broad consensus. These conclusions also demand attention to the 
informal political, sociological, and psychological factors that condition them.
Consensus in and o f itself is not desirable,” concludes Moreno.**
Private Sector Commissions 
The National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction is a private sector panel 
which has members from the fields of eth ics, theology, law, medicine, genetics, and 
public policy. It was established in 1991 to provide a forum for “reasoned discussion of 
ethical and policy issues raised by the new reproductive technologies, fetal and embryo 
research, and fetal tissue use; and to make recommendations about these issues.”*® The 
work is designed to assist policy makers, physicians and nurses, and members of the 
public.
The board was established to step into a vacuum in American public life created 
by the lack of a national body to initiate and stimulate debate about ethical and policy
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issues arising in reproductive practice and research. According to the board’s book. New 
Ways o f  Making Babies, officials in this country have been anxious to avoid developing 
guidelines on such politically explosive subjects, and only physicians who provide these 
procedures have developed standards for employing them.
The American Fertility Society, now known as the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, has been developing guidelines for the use of assisted 
reproduction since 1986. These guidelines are prefaced by overviews o f ethics and the 
law, and provide a sense of current practice in reproductive medicine. Practitioners 
themselves, however, recognize the need for some guidance from an interdisciplinary 
group that functioned independently o f  physician organizations. The American Fertility 
Society, along with the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, provided 
seed money to establish the board as a “disinterested external organization” that could 
begin to develop comprehensive guidelines for use o f methods of assisted reproduction 
and provide advice on research in this area. This board is now funded by private 
foundations.**
After considering a variety o f  viewpoints, the board has made the following 
recommendations regarding egg donation: a wider range of information should be offered 
to potential egg recipients and donors; counseling should be an essential element in all 
programs; screening of recipients and donors should be kept distinct from counseling; the 
practice o f egg donation in women o f  advanced reproductive age should be pursued only 
with extreme caution; single women should be granted access to this procedure with 
counseling about special considerations; egg donation programs should offer standard
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measures o f reimbursement; arrangements in which poor women donate eggs to those 
who are well-to-do in exchange for coverage of their own in vitro fertilization procedure 
should be discouraged; donors should be screened for voluntariness with special review 
in cases o f intra-familial donation; programs should purchase insurance to compensate 
donors who suffer injury or disability due to their participation; donors and recipients 
should be matched on the basis o f whether they want to relate as known persons or as 
non-identified persons; a broadly constituted task force should develop inter-center 
guidelines for many facets of egg donation; a centrally coordinated network of registries 
should be established in this country with permanent records containing medical, genetic, 
and certain social information about donors in either identifiable or coded form.**
The board also reviewed the policies of four fertility clinics. It foimd that the 
policy concerning the age of an egg recipient is different at each clinic, ranging from 43 
years to no limit. The age for egg donors was pretty much the same — under 35. All 
these clinics had various policies for counseling, donor and recipient screening, and donor 
anonymity.
In their report, the board states: “There are significant moral issues surrounding 
egg donation about which NABER members were able to reach consensus, even though 
they disagreed about the weight of the moral values involved.” The report’s contents are 
not designed to give legal guidance, although they take accoimt of current legal findings 
and scholarship. They tried to build a consensus about the issues that reflected a broad 
societal consensus whenever possible.*®
Their report states that even though egg donation is an established practice, many
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o f the most fundamental questions about its moral acceptability have been bypassed. 
Board members believe it is important to consider the underlying question o f whether this 
practice is ethically unobjectionable in principle and to inquire about how it affects, for 
good or ill, our culture and religious understandings o f  procreation, marriage, parenthood, 
children and women. The arguments fall into two categories: questions about the 
meaning o f marriage, parenthood, and procreation, on one hand, and the consequences of 
the practice for the resulting children, or for the donors, on the other hand. Their 
principles include respect for personal autonomy, informed consent, privacy, non- 
commodiflcation o f  human beings and their bodies, the moral significance o f the family 
as a basic social unit, equal respect and concern for all human beings, and the fair and 
appropriate distribution o f societal resources. This framework of values is relevant to 
board members in questions raised by the technique o f  egg donation. They plan to 
investigate the way in which these values apply to the use of other techniques o f assisted 
reproduction in future reports. Their ultimate plan is to develop a comprehensive ethical 
framework that can be used to guide the development o f current and future reproductive 
technologies that is grounded in careful case studies o f  these technologies. They believe 
more discussion is needed among societal members before that step is taken.'*®
In a section on public policy and the use of egg donation, the board states there is 
no explicit public policy in the United States directed toward some of the pressing ethical 
and social questions raised by egg donation. Legislation regulating the procedure is 
virtually non-existent and courts are hearing a few cases. No national commission has 
been established to consider its ethical, social, legal, and policy implications, and to craft
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guidelines for its use. This is largely left to infertile people, egg donors, and health care 
professionals. As a result, practices vary from center to center, and information is not 
readily available outside the clinic.
Egg donation is a way o f creating children and families and touches basic issues 
about the sort o f society in which we live and will create for future generations. It is 
among the new reproductive technologies that raise fundamental policy questions about 
the appropriate means for setting social priorities, and ultimately who decides and 
controls the use o f genetic and reproductive technologies in a  democratic society.
Board members considered four ways in which a greater degree o f societal 
direction could be addressed: a framework of laws and regulations; common law cases; 
policies developed through a national forum in the public or private sector; and guidelines 
crafted by health care professionals through their professional groups or through inter-egg 
donation center committees. Legislation is needed to assign parenthood and to ensure 
record-keeping about egg donors and to assign parenthood to the egg recipient, the board 
concludes. Also, state legislatures should pass laws clarifying the legal status and rights 
o f all those involved in this procedure. Serious and timely consideration should be given 
to establishing a federal regulatory body to license infertility centers.'**
Summary
While some argue whether consensus on reproductive technologies is desirable, 
others say it is desirable but not achievable. Still others say consensus is achievable, but 
differ on how to achieve it. Commissions have successfully dealt with other
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controversial social issues, and serve as an example for the formation o f a similar 
commission to resolve issues related to assisted reproduction. Some commissions have 
even grappled with some o f these issues but not with the kind o f objectivity and scope the 
subject deserves. The next chapter, the conclusion, shows why a national commission 
should be formed and how it could work to develop consensus.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
The use o f reproductive technologies, according to one author, wears two faces. 
To some, the technique brings with it the capacity to carry society down a slope of 
increasingly negative applications. To others, it is a simple medical technique offering 
hope to people in need. Andrea Bonnicksen writes in her book: “We have upon our 
backs the weight o f unresolved polarity about basic in vitro fertilization, and we have 
failed to take account of the areas o f consensus that lie hidden beneath the headlines and 
flamboyant symbols.” i This author claims the government has not gotten involved in the 
issue because it is too controversial.
Another author states public consensus has been reached: “The trophy of a public 
policy is to turn a particular interpretation into an accepted fact which seems beyond the 
stage of negotiation.” This is crucial because it guides legal rulings concerning the right 
to motherhood and reproductive freedom.2
In many parts of the country, there are no standards about who can open a fertility 
clinic, what should be done with frozen embryos, or who owns them. Arthur Caplan, an 
ethicist at the University of Pennsylvania, questions whether the United States can create 
a moral and legal framework that keeps an eye out for the best interests of the children.
He agrees that legislation should cover the legal ownership o f reproductive materials and
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patient consent regarding the donation o f embryos. He also thinks there should be some 
kind of standards regarding age, income or marital status for patients wishing to use 
reproductive technology.*
It seems that every person who gives some serious thought to the issue of 
reproductive technologies comes up with a different conclusion about its moral 
acceptability, even if  it’s slightly different. While one person believes surrogacy is 
acceptable under any condition, others say it is only acceptable if  the surrogate is not 
paid; still others say it is not an acceptable practice under any circumstances. Surrogacy 
has been banned in some countries. In the United States, the practice is legally 
acceptable in most states if  the surrogate mother is reimbursed only for certain expenses 
and other costs, similar to adoption.
In trying to decide the best approach for dealing with reproductive technologies, 
this paper has looked at several questions, which were mentioned in the introduction.
First, who are making the decisions about these technologies today, and is that ethically 
acceptable to most people? Second, if most policy decisions are being made by judges, 
and to a lesser extent legislators and administrators, are they good decisions that take into 
account ethical dilemmas? Third, if laws are not the answer, or only part of the answer, 
what examples are available to use as a guide, and what works and doesn’t work about 
them? Fourth, is moral consensus the right thing to strive for, keeping in mind our need 
for personal autonomy? Fifth, would the establishment of a national commission fit in 
with this country’s style and tradition of decision making, and do precedents serve as 
good indications for the success of an ethical commission in this area? Sixth, does the
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establishment o f  a national commission on reproductive technologies fill a real need in 
this country? Finally, what would an ethics commission look like in terms of authority, 
scope, membership, and function? Answering these questions gives us another answer to 
what may play an important, necessary role in this country.
The Decision Makers 
Who are making the decisions about these technologies today, and is that ethically 
acceptable to most people? Depending on who one talks to in this area, the answers vary. 
Hov/ever, most people would agree, I believe, that preliminary decisions about whether to 
find out about a  reproductive technique is made by those who want a child and have the 
money to pay for any procedures or transactions in order to get an offspring. This could 
be a married or unmarried couple, a single woman, an older woman, a gay couple, and so 
on. For some reason, usually infertility, these persons cannot have a child by themselves 
and need third party assistance. In the case of surrogacy, contractual agreements are 
made, often with a lawyer and the surrogate mother. If a visit is made to a fertility clinic, 
the prospective clinics must abide by clinic policies, which vary from clinic to clinic. 
Some doctors are reluctant to administer procedures to single women, lesbians, and older 
women due to their own personal beliefs. Some legislation forbids surrogate contracts, or 
forbids artificial insemination outside of a doctor’s office. After the procedure is 
underway, or the child is bom and there is a dispute for whatever reason, judges often 
determine what is in the best interest of the child or the parent’s intent prior to the 
pregnancy. Judges also are deciding cases concerning frozen embryos, child support and
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child custody, and clinic fraud and abuse. Legislators, in some cases, have determined 
limits on some o f the procedures, and who is considered the legal parent in some 
instances, but not all.
So, in summary, prospective parents decide if  they’re interested in the procedure. 
Doctors and clinic policies decide if  they can undergo the procedure, and judges decide 
any disputes arising from these initial decisions. Almost nobody disputes the decisions 
that are made by infertile couples wishing to have a child, except those wishing to have a 
child through a surrogacy contract. Others would like to place limits on those who do not 
represent traditional families because they sincerely believe, correctly or incorrectly, that 
it is not in the best interest o f the child involved. There are disputes back and forth about 
what is best for a child, and many believe that a child raised in a loving, secure 
environment, regardless o f  the exact parental arrangements, has a chance for a good life. 
This debate is at the heart o f the “culture war” between orthodox conservatives and 
progressives. Where reproductive technologies fit into the larger picture of the changing 
role of the family deserves thoughtful scrutiny.
I believe doctors control too much of the decision making, and I am concerned 
about the role that courts play. Judges have fashioned most o f  the public policy in this 
area while legislators have played a much smaller role. Federal policy makers, with a few 
minor exceptions, have played little or no role,
I would like to take some o f the ethical decision making from doctors, judges and 
politicians, and place it with some diverse, thoughtful persons who can help guide new 
policy in this arena, and even provide advice to the courts and legislatures as appropriate.
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Flaws in the Laws
If most public policy decisions are being made by judges, and to a lesser extent 
legislators and administrators, are they good decisions that take into account ethical 
dilemmas? While many people believe the law is part of the answer to questions about 
reproductive technologies, one has to keep in mind what law is and what it isn’t.
According to Roger Dworkin, author o f Limits, law is not the same as science."* 
While a scientist describes a person’s state o f  mind in agonizing detail, a lawmaker 
determines whether society will be better o ff to send a convicted criminal to prison or to a 
mental hospital. The scientist has no special claim to expertise about considerations such 
as expense, impact on others, the moral sense o f the community, or ease of 
administration.
Law is not ethics, either, and this is an important point. Ethics is a branch of 
philosophy about how persons ought to behave. Some ethicists argue that ethics involves 
primarily questions about what ought to be done rather than about how to decide what 
ought to be done. Law is temporal and involves sanctions, but can also embody ethics.
Law is what allows a society to reach conclusions on difficult problems without 
knowing in advance what the solutions to the problems should be. A careful look at the 
different kinds o f lawmaking — common law, legislation, constitutional adjudication, and 
administrative rule-making — reveal the strengths and weaknesses o f each.
All federal and state legislation is drafted on a background o f common law. 
Common law adjudication is a legal system in which judges get their information from
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lawyers and make law mostly on a state-by-state basis through the resolution of real, 
existing disputes one case at a time. Decisions are based largely on analogy and 
precedent. The backward-looking nature o f the common law is still another reason to 
doubt the common law’s ability to deal with new problems posed by rapid changes in 
science and technology.
In common law, remedies are limited. The most common remedy is to order one 
person to pay money to another. Common law courts usually award money because they 
don’t have the staff ability or authority to regulate behavior in detail or to supervise 
ongoing activities. Many problems posed by biomedical advance seem to call for 
relatively detailed regulation and supervision.*
Common law is made by judges who sit in state supreme and appellate courts. 
Most judges are appointed and many serve for life. Most have expertise in law but not in 
medicine or science. They are inexpert, undemocratic lawmakers who get their 
information from lawyers, litigants, and law clerks. They have no large staffs such as 
legislators, and do not hold investigative hearings.
Most common law is made by state courts, which means that common law 
development is unlikely to provide uniform, national resolution o f issues. The common 
law is ill-suited to comprehensive, systematic lawmaking.
Processing scientific and technical information is one of the jobs that many judges 
do with the least skill and the greatest impatience, according to David Horowitz, author of 
Courts and Social Policv.® In a court case, judges look at whether one party has a right 
while legislators and administrators, in contrast, look at alternatives. Adjudication, then.
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is narrow. The format o f decision-making inhibits the presentation of an array o f 
alternatives and  the e x p lic i t  matching o f  b e n e fits  to  c o s ts , s ta tes  Horowitz.*
In court cases, the judge’s power to decide extends, in principle, only to those 
issues that are before him. Related issues, not raised by the instant dispute, must wait for 
later litigation. The focused, piecemeal quality o f adjudication implies that judicial 
decisions tend to be abstracted from social contexts broader than the immediate setting in 
which the litigation arises. The potentially unrepresentative character of the litigants 
makes it hazardous to generalize from their situations to the wider context, according to 
Horowitz.*
In court cases, judges do not initiate action; they hear disputes brought to them by 
parties. Judicial decisions become a chance occurrence with no guarantee that the 
litigants are representative of the scope o f problems their case represents.®
In a court case, historical facts are events that have transpired between the parties 
to a lawsuit. Social facts are the recurrent patterns o f behavior on which a policy must be 
based. Social facts are nothing new in litigation. Courts have always had to make 
assumptions or inferences about general conditions that would guide their decisions. As 
the courts move into new, specialized policy areas, they must deal with human behavioral 
problems that are beyond their ability to answer on the basis o f  their own experience or 
through expert testimony, he explains.
If a judge or a jury make a mistake of fact relating only to the case before it, the 
effects of the mistake are limited. But if those facts are used to make general policy, the 
consequences cannot be so confined. This is one reason some favor common law.
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In general, the parties can be depended upon to elicit all o f  the relevant historical 
facts, through the ordinary use o f testimony and documentary evidence, and the judge or 
jury can be presumed competent to evaluate that evidence. Social facts, on the other 
hand, may not be elicited at all by the parties, and the competence of the decision maker 
in this field carmot be taken for granted. These deficiencies o f the adversary process have 
led to proposals tor the employment o f outside experts as consultants to the courts."
Expert testimony is the conventional way for the litigants to prove social facts, but 
its deficiencies are considerable. Rules o f evidence are geared toward the search for truth 
between the parties, not to the search for truth in general.
Horowitz states that issues dealing with social facts have been handled poorly by 
the courts because they are not future-minded. Usually, adjudication makes no provision 
for review of a policy. Judges base their decisions on antecedent facts, on behavior that 
antedates the litigation. Consequential facts — those that related to the impact o f a 
decision on behavior — are equally important but much neglected. Litigation is geared 
toward rectifying the injustices o f the past and present rather than planning for some 
change to occur in the future.'*
Legislation, in contrast, is law made by elected representatives, who may be 
informed by a large number and wide variety o f sources. It can deal with problems 
prospectively and offers greater speed and more certainty than the common law. 
Legislation is more democratic and more political. Legislators have access to a large 
amount of information, have large staffs, and hold hearings.
However, legislators are also too busy to become experts on many topics.
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Legislative information comes primarily from lobbyists and other persons with personal 
agendas, not from objective experts. Legislation is the product o f inexpert decision 
makers using biased, partial, and ill-understood information to form the bases for their 
actions. While legislators can act in advance, they often don’t. Legislation could be 
faster, but the passage o f  bills is often a slow process, and legislation may freeze science 
and technology in a certain moment.
Regulations made by government agencies also play a role. Although no 
regulations have been made by any federal government agency on the use of reproductive 
technologies, it is instructive to note the character o f this type o f  law-making as a 
potential fiiture remedy for issues related to reproductive technologies. Administrative 
law is made by appointed officials who are not directly accountable to the public. These 
persons, usually civil servants, must be experts in the area being regulated. This kind of 
lawmaking is designed to proceed informally and can engage in both rule making and 
adjudication. This is supposed to be fast, responsive, expert decision making. However, 
administrative lawmaking is highly formalized, remarkably technical, and extremely 
complex. Administrative agencies are often created and overseen by legislatures.
Constitutional adjudication is law made by judges, who get their information from 
lawyers. It involves the national imposition o f  solutions, sweeping in its analogical and 
geographic impact, and difficult to change. It is made through case-by-case adjudication 
with real, existing disputes serving as vehicles for lawmaking.
Only Supreme Court decisions are definitive. Supreme court judges are 
nondemocratic, inexpert decision makers who have enormous power. The only way to
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change constitutional decisions are to amend the constitution or to convince the Supreme 
Court to reverse itself. Since the Bill o f  Rights, the Constitution has only been amended 
17 times.
People want speedy answers to questions about reproductive technologies. In 
many cases, a concern for medical ethics often has become a plea for medical law. The 
law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the 
treatment of real persons. To suggest that law has no role to play would be wrong and 
unrealistic. Yet the law can’t solve everything. Much of the law that exists today is ill 
advised. Law is a collection o f tools of limited utility, according to Dworkin.’"
Even if lawmakers were able to understand and keep pace with scientific change, 
however, they would be unable to effect wise, principled, or across-the-board responses 
to the social issues posed by biomedical advances. Every serious social question posed 
by biomedical advance seems to involve conflict between right and right, according to 
Dworkin. Assisted reproduction pits the desires o f infertile couples to achieve 
parenthood and of individuals to capitalize on their physical resources against concerns 
about demanding and imposing on women and irresponsible treatment o f children.
Administrative agencies can be helpful when they restrict their lawmaking to their 
spheres of expertise and try to regulate as non-disruptively as possible, but they can go 
off the political deep end, can exceed their competence, and are non-accountable, he 
adds/s
Currently, judges have the most say in the direction o f reproductive technologies. 
As can be seen, though, those decisions are not the most representative o f  society.
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However, it is about the only snapshot of society we have to determine any kind o f broad- 
based consideration on these issues. While legislation exists, mostly at the state level, it 
is not consistent and revealing enough for policy makers as a whole.
Also, laws and regulations are not designed to deal with the ethical issues facing 
this country. A judge may interpret a dispute according to analogy and precedent, but 
that doesn’t mean there will be any consideration given to moral values. In that area, 
there is indeed a vacuum.
Examples o f Other Countries 
I f  laws are not the answer, or only part o f  the answer, what examples are available 
to use as a guide, and what works and doesn’t work about them? One can begin by 
analyzing the models o f other countries. Recognizing that these countries are not 
necessarily the same in character or legal framework, they are nevertheless faced with the 
same concerns about how to deal with the rapid advance of new technologies that help so 
many people, yet force new definitions of parenthood and family that are confusing and 
troublesome to many.
In attempting to reach a consensus, governments have identified various 
approaches. In France, the state o f Victoria in Australia, and Canada, considerable time 
was given by the government to provide an opportunity for public debate. In the United 
Kingdom, a more limited format was adopted by creating an evidence-gathering 
committee whose terms of reference probably were vague to the general population.
Italy has taken limited measures.
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At the very least, the public has an interest in obtaining accurate information 
about the risks, benefits and costs of this technology. Most countries have gone too far in 
the area o f reproductive technologies to forbid its use now. Thus, they are making 
attempts through licensing bodies to monitor and control these technologies. Examples 
can be foimd in the United Kingdom and Canada with the establishment or proposed 
establishment o f  licensing authorities to regulate clinics and monitor new technological 
advances.
The French model is a good example to follow in terms of approach. The 
government encouraged a broad public debate before considering ethical issues. Then the 
panel set principles which they consistently used to make reconunendations which could 
be turned into statutes. Unfortunately, the panel’s work has not been tested in the French 
parliament. However, I don’t believe the lack of eventual outcome detracts from its 
attractiveness as a  model.
In the United States, the debate is centered mainly on the autonomy of service 
consumers and providers. Government is placed against the individual, and debates occur 
about the degree to which moral teachings ought to be imposed upon the population in 
the name o f good order and morale. This generates a rights-based discussion, in which 
competing interests argue about the principles embedded in the U.S. Constitution and 
Bill of Rights. Any bioethics commission created for the U.S. goverrunent would have 
to be responsive to this political reality.'®
The Canadian goverrunent follows a principles-based approach. The commission 
completed its work in a comprehensive fashion with modem methods o f gathering public
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input. They used toll-free telephone numbers, public surveys, public hearings, and other 
means to get public opinion on this subject. In all, they said more than 40,000 people 
were involved. That is an impressive number of people. Many of these people were 
researchers, who studied various issues. The commission issued a report, leaving it up to 
the government to introduce legislation, which eventually happened.
The title o f the Commission’s report, “Proceed with Care,” shows that progress is 
good if tempered with thought and consideration. The commission urged a two-part 
approach. They made recommendations about which technologies and practices should 
be baimed, such as human cloning research and payments for gametes. These 
reconunendations should be turned into national legislation. The conunissioners also 
recommended a licensing board to govern new technologies and regulate clinics using 
acceptable practices.
A look at these groups in general brings several points to mind: public debate and 
discussion is essential to a commission’s work; the development of underlying ethical 
principles guides the commission’s work more clearly; legislation is often considered as 
part of the reconunendations that are made; a permanent licensing body is also considered 
necessary to keep the commission’s work alive; and extreme caution must be used when 
attempting to impose restrictions on personal autonomy.
Most important, these countries are faced with the same kinds o f decisions about 
reproductive technologies as in America. In this country, however, the use o f these 
technologies is more prevalent. Each country, at separate times but for similar reasons, 
decided to study these issues in order to determine what is acceptable and unacceptable
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from a moral viewpoint. This hasn’t happened in the United States. While many 
ethicists call for such a stand, it hasn’t reached the turning point. It seems that some 
positive steps should be taken in this area before the issue becomes too divisive, as the 
abortion debate has done.
As has been shown, the United States has formed national commissions on 
various topics, especially in the past century, and most have been considered a success. 
While a national commission has not been formed in this area specifically, other 
commissions have been formed to study areas o f controversial research. The best 
example is the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
£ind Biomedical and Behavioral Research Studies, which made policy recommendations 
about many bioethical issues during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
A look at moral consensus and the use o f ethics commissions in general shows 
that valuable work has been done in this arena. This work has not been without its critics, 
however. Some people question the usefulness o f commissions while others question 
their moral authority. Ethics commissions can help to inform and guide the rest of 
society on difficult issues, particularly when there isn’t enough time devoted to these 
issues by the general public. The important point is that a commission respects the 
general principles o f a liberal society, accommodating and respecting divergent 
viewpoints. Also, representation of a broader society is essential as well as a general 
agreement on basic moral principles that can guide the deliberations on each difficult case 
or issue. Also, there must be broad agreement that consensus is needed on an issue 
before setting up a commission. Consensus for the sake of consensus is without value.
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Moral Consensus
Is moral consensus the right thing to strive for, keeping in mind our need for 
personal autonomy? Many bioethicists and others have debated this issue. It seems that 
the alternatives are no decisions being made and no consensus being reached, or one 
expert moral authority determining what is good and bad for society. These new 
technologies are not like the invention of the telephone or the airplane. While those 
innovations had a dramatic effect on society, these technologies are changing the core of 
the family, long thought to be the major component of our social structure. The very 
reason it cuts to the heart o f  our personal, private lives is the reason there is a resistance 
to regulate these new technologies. Family life has always been considered somewhat 
sacred. So how does someone convince people that taking a look at these technologies 
with an eye toward monitoring and controlling them is good for them?
The bottom line is that decisions are made every day on behalf o f society. It 
seems that if  there is significant discussion and input about the principles that are 
important in the area o f reproductive technologies, then some decisions may be made that 
respect personal autonomy and improve society as a whole.
However, any discussion about assisted reproduction would inevitably include 
deliberations about the family. The changing role o f the family already is affecting the 
courts and the legislatures through the passage o f laws that tend to reflect traditional 
views of the family. Before attempting any kind of consensus, though, a group of 
persons would have to study the issues and how they affect the various stakeholders: the
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parents, the children, the embryos, doctors, lawyers, judges, consumers, and so on. 
Because assisted reproduction deals with a larger issue that affects everyone, any kind o f 
consensus would need to reflect the larger discussion.
If there is no attempt to achieve moral consensus, what we are left with are judges 
and doctors who decide what is best for society, in effect. They are the ones who are 
making decisions in these areas now. Prospective parents may decide whether or not to 
undergo treatment, but doctors may turn down patients, and judges determine child 
support, custody and other related issues in court cases. This will continue to be the case 
to some extent, but the debate can be broadened to include all stakeholders by the 
establishment of a mechanism for achieving a form of moral consensus.
The Canadian government commission states the importance o f  placing 
boundaries around the new reproductive technologies, and to guide and control them 
within those boundaries. Otherwise, some o f these technologies could harm individuals 
and society as a whole.
Filling a Void
Does the establishment o f a national commission on reproductive technologies fill 
a real need in this country? The National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction was 
established to “step into a vacuum in American public life created by the lack of a 
national body to initiate and stimulate debate about ethical and policy issues arising in 
reproductive practice and research.” '* The industry’s viewpoint is that officials in this 
country have been anxious to avoid developing guidelines on the subject. Practitioners
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themselves, however, recognize the need for some guidance from an interdisciplinary 
group that functions independently o f  physician organizations. Throughout this paper 
there have been citations from bioethicists, writers, feminists, and others that some form 
of guidance is needed, whether it is from legislation, regulations, commission 
recommendations, or the like.
While attempts to form recommendations by the National Advisory Board on 
Ethics in Reproduction may be considered thoughtful, courageous, and praiseworthy, it is 
not distant enough from the medical community to have the credibility and moral 
authority needed by our society. That would involve the formation o f a  national ethics 
commission.
Formation o f a National Commission 
What would an ethics commission look like in terms of authority, scope, 
membership, and function? While consensus may be difficult to reach, and despite 
negative comments about the effectiveness o f achieving any group consensus, 1 believe it 
is feasible to form a panel, commission or board to examine reproductive technologies.
First and foremost, this panel should seek a diversity o f viewpoints throughout the 
country, widely publicizing meetings and hearings to allow for sufficient input. Toll-free 
telephone numbers, faxes, and web sites could be useful, also. Special invitations should 
be sent out to those involved in this issue as well as those who aren’t.
This commission should consist o f  members representing medicine, philosophy, 
sociology, law, bioethics, religion, women’s groups, voters’ organizations, political
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parties, government agencies such as the Department o f Health and Human Services, 
infertility patients, fertility clinics, and the general public. At least half should be 
women. This commission should report to the President, the findings o f which could be 
turned into legislation for consideration by Congress, or into regulations to be considered 
by the Executive Branch, as appropriate.
I believe it is important that the judicial branch continue to decide cases on an 
individual basis, but I believe it is more important to establish a consistent and coherent 
regulatory and/or legal framework which protects and informs infertility patients about 
their choices, risks and chances for success. This type of work would have the most far- 
reaching impact on the greatest majority of persons. More difficult philosophical 
questions are important and must be discussed, but I believe it is important to take a hard 
look at the infertility business from a consumer protection standpoint.
There is much justification for regulations to protect consumers. Consumer 
Reports called infertility treatments a “crapshoot,” one that costs $8,000 to $10,000 a roll.
There’s no way for a couple to know how a particular clinic performs, according to their 
researchers. Many patients don’t realize the cost versus success ratio. It is estimated that 
about one in eight women who undergo the procedure will conceive. One article states 
that clinics market themselves by their success rates. The competition for patients has led 
to exaggerated claims and renewed appeals by some medical ethicists to regulate the 
clinics. These clinics take in about $2 billion a year.'*
Another factor coming to light is the long-term health effects on the mother. 
Preliminary findings based on a 1993 study by Stanford University epidemiologists
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indicate that women who took fertility drugs were three times as likely to develop ovarian 
cancer as women who didn’t.
There are other stories about fertility clinics taking eggs from mothers without 
their knowledge and giving them to other women. The issue seems to be how to best 
regulate the industry, not whether it should be regulated. A Presidential commission 
could seek out this answer in its deliberations.
The commission could also look at whether the enactment o f regulations should 
be left up to the courts, the medical profession, state legislators, federal regulators or 
congressional legislation. State legislatures already have made some decisions; many 
judges already have listened to debates on this issue; and the federal government already 
has looked at some aspects. However, no entity has taken a comprehensive look at the 
infertility issue and made comprehensive recommendations. Other countries have 
managed to do this with varying degrees of success such as the United Kingdom. It 
seems odd that the United States, one of the largest users o f  reproductive technologies in 
the world, has not taken a comprehensive stand on this issue.
The piecemeal approach taken by the courts is unacceptable because it doesn’t 
consider the whole issue. For example, if access to reproductive technology is available, 
should it be available to everyone? While arguments are made that access is restricted in 
the best interests o f the prospective children, is that really the case? Is prejudice or 
justice really being served when single mothers, lesbians and older women are not 
allowed to undergo infertility treatments? A closer look at adoption practices could be 
applied in this instance. Legislation may be far more preferable than abiding by the
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discretionary practices o f those controlling the technologies. While many persons 
studying the issue believe we have moved too far forward to turn back the clock in the 
area of reproductive technologies, it may be worthwhile to examine whether this is really 
the case. This would be another primary task of the commission, which could be a 
permanent body unless the members decide to establish another commission after their 
work is completed. This group should not forget that it represents the broader public in 
its deliberations.
It is time for our country to decide where it wants to go on this issue. The only 
way to do this is to decide on a specific course of action. Any course of action has its 
merits and faults, but the decision to do something is what’s important. We need to find 
out where we want to go as a country and what is the most prudent course to take. 
Consensus may not be reached, but it could be strived for thoughtfully and thoroughly.
First, information and protection are needed to help those who already are 
involved in infertility treatments. Second, we need to feel comfortable knowing that 
infertility treatments are acceptable to the majority within certain guidelines. Those who 
have discomfort with this issue might feel better knowing that we have carefully 
considered this issue, and it is under control. We should not allow extreme or 
experimental practices to be used on patients or allow them to be manipulated by greedy 
clinics.
Some people will never accept a supposed infiingement on their fundamental 
rights, but that is an issue debated about many issues. All we can hope for is that some 
fair legal decisions are made which benefit the majority of the people most of the time.
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We ought to be looking at how these new families fit into society, either through 
education, counseling, or regulation. Children’s educational programs, for example, are 
extremely sensitive to different family structures such as single parent homes, 
grandparent homes, etc. If  reproductive technologies are here to stay, why not institute 
some kind o f educational program for society? There is a general lack of knowledge 
and, some might say, interest in this subject by those who are seemingly unaffected by it. 
But these technologies affect everyone in society, and there should be an assimilation 
process.
First, though, acceptable technologies should be safe and effective. Second, some 
technologies may be unacceptable. Third, acceptable technologies should be considered 
in light o f the changing role o f the family. A Presidential commission could tackle one or 
more of these areas, depending on the information members receive from the active, 
thorough, and thoughtful solicitation of views.
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